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1. Introduction
Risk preferences are integral to mod-ern economics. They are the primary 
focus of the literature on decision making 
under uncertainty. They play a central role 
in insurance and financial economics. The 
topics of risk sharing and insurance are 
prominent in development, health, labor, 
and  public  economics, particularly in the 
study of  incentives and social insurance 
programs. And risk preferences are a major 
driver in models of consumption, invest-
ment, and asset pricing in macroeconomics. 
While much of the literature is theoretical 
in nature, deriving qualitative predictions 
in different environments, there is also a 
large empirical literature that estimates risk 
preferences, both their magnitude and their 
nature.
Most of the literature uses expected util-
ity (EU) theory to model risk preferences. 
Under EU theory, there are two potential 
sources of variation in attitudes toward risk: 
people might differ in (i) their degree of 
diminishing marginal utility for wealth (their 
utility curvature), or (ii) their subjective 
beliefs. Over the years, however, economists 
have come to recognize additional sources of 
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variation in attitudes toward risk, and have 
integrated these into “non-EU” models. The 
most prominent of these additional sources 
are (iii) probability distortions (such as in 
rank-dependent EU) and (iv) reference-de-
pendent utility (as in loss aversion).
Early empirical studies on risk preferences 
focus on the EU model and rely on data 
from laboratory experiments (e.g., Preston 
and Baratta 1948; Yaari 1965); for reviews, 
see Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000). 
Laboratory experiments generated many 
insights about risk preferences, and most 
notably demonstrated both substantial het-
erogeneity in risk preferences and substan-
tial deviations from EU theory. However, 
the limitations commonly associated with 
the laboratory setting—e.g., concerns about 
ecological and external validity—motivated 
economists to look for suitable data from 
field settings—i.e., environments in which 
people’s real-world economic behavior is 
observable.
As a result, there is a relatively small but 
growing literature that takes on the difficult 
task of estimating risk preferences using 
field data. Our goal in this review is to sur-
vey and assess this literature, with a partic-
ular emphasis on clarifying the differences 
among potential sources of variation in risk 
attitudes and highlighting how one might 
tease them apart. We concentrate our atten-
tion on studies in which risk preferences are 
the focal object and estimating their struc-
ture is the core enterprise. In particular, 
we generally exclude papers that estimate a 
structural model of risk preferences, but do 
not treat the risk preference parameters as 
the parameters of main interest. Although 
there are many excellent papers in this cat-
egory that make important contributions 
to numerous fields of economics, they are 
beyond the scope of this review.1
1 As we explain below, however, we discuss a handful 
of papers that, although they fall into this category, make 
We begin in section 2 with a motivating 
example designed to address the question 
of why economists should care about the 
structure of risk preferences. More and 
more, economists are engaging in analyses 
that investigate the quantitative impact of a 
change in the underlying environment (e.g., 
a legal reform). In such analyses, risk pref-
erences are often a required input, even if 
only as part of a broader model. Our exam-
ple highlights two reasons that the specifica-
tion of risk preferences matters. First, many 
quantitative analyses attempt to make out-
of-sample predictions for behavior based on 
the broader model. We demonstrate in our 
example how different assumptions about 
risk preferences can lead to different out-
of-sample predictions for behavior. Second, 
many quantitative analyses attempt to reach 
welfare conclusions. We discuss how differ-
ent assumptions about risk preferences can 
lead to different welfare conclusions.
In section 3, we provide a detailed review 
of several models of risk preferences. 
Section 3 does not contain an exhaustive list 
of all models of risk preferences, but rather 
focuses on those that have been estimated or 
otherwise studied using field data. We begin 
with EU theory, and proceed to describe 
several non-EU models that were origi-
nally motivated by experimental evidence, 
but which subsequently have been studied 
using field data, including rank-dependent 
expected utility (RDEU) theory and cumula-
tive prospect theory (CPT). In section 4, we 
then provide a discussion of identification, 
and in particular describe what types of data 
are needed to estimate and distinguish the 
various models.
In section 5, we discuss research that 
estimates risk preferences, and sometimes 
heterogeneity in risk preferences, using indi-
vidual-level data. We begin with an overview 
valuable contributions to the methodology of estimating 
risk preferences using field data. 
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of the general approach used throughout the 
literature. Next, we describe in detail research 
that estimates risk preferences using data on 
property-insurance choices. We then briefly 
discuss studies that use data from television 
game shows. Lastly, we review a handful of 
recent papers that analyze data on health-in-
surance choices. Although health insurance 
is an important field context, we limit the 
depth of our coverage because the papers 
that use health-insurance data do not focus 
on estimating risk preferences. We believe 
this is because estimating risk preferences 
using health-insurance data is especially 
challenging. Nevertheless, we highlight a 
few recent papers that address some of these 
challenges and whose contributions could 
facilitate future work that focuses on esti-
mating risk preferences.
In section 6, we turn to research that 
estimates risk preferences, and sometimes 
heterogeneity in risk preferences, using 
 market-level, or aggregate, data. Once again, 
we begin with an overview of the general 
approach of the literature, highlighting how 
the use of aggregate data naturally requires 
a stronger set of assumptions in order to 
identify risk preferences. Next, we describe 
in detail research that estimates risk prefer-
ences using data on betting markets, specif-
ically data on betting in pari-mutuel horse 
races. We then discuss a select assortment 
of papers that use macroeconomic data to 
estimate risk preferences, including data on 
consumption and investment (asset returns) 
and on labor supply.
Finally, in section 7 we discuss a number of 
directions for future research. An under-re-
searched issue is the extent to which risk pref-
erences are stable across contexts. We review 
the few studies that use field data to inves-
tigate this issue, and we highlight the ques-
tions left open by these studies. Relatedly, 
we also discuss the possibility of combining 
data from laboratory and field settings in 
order to paint a more complete picture of 
risk  preferences—and also to gain insight 
on the question of whether experimental 
results can be directly applied to make field 
 predictions. Next, we describe the recent lit-
erature on using surveys to measure risk per-
ceptions, and we discuss the extent to which 
survey data might be usefully combined with 
field data to identify and estimate risk prefer-
ences under weaker assumptions. Finally, we 
discuss the importance of “mental account-
ing,” by which we mean assumptions about 
how people translate a complex field context 
into a set of concrete lotteries to be evalu-
ated. We encourage future research to pay 
more careful attention to such assumptions.
2. Motivating Example
In this section, we present a stylized 
example designed to motivate why econo-
mists should care about the structure of risk 
preferences. The setting of our example is a 
hypothetical insurance market. We make a 
number of strong assumptions—about the 
setting and the data—that make identifica-
tion and estimation more straightforward. 
In later sections, we highlight some of the 
identification and estimation challenges 
that economists face in more realistic field 
settings.
Imagine that there is a continuum of house-
holds of measure one who each face the pos-
sibility of a loss  L that occurs with probability 
μ . Both  L and  μ are the same across house-
holds, and their values are fixed and known.2 
To fix ideas, let  L = 10,000 and  μ = 0.05 . 
There is insurance available to the house-
holds—full insurance at a price  p . Moreover, 
there is sufficient exogenous price variation 
(e.g., over time or across various identical sub-
sets of the households; see Einav, Finkelstein, 
and Cullen 2010 for an example) to non-
parametrically identify the  market-demand 
2 Note that by assuming  μ is fixed, we are abstracting 
from moral hazard. 
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function for full insurance,  Q F (p) , which 
returns the fraction of households willing to 
purchase full insurance at price  p . Panel A of 
figure 1 depicts one such demand function, 
namely  Q F (p)  = 2 − 0.001p . It is a typical 
demand function—as the price of insurance 
decreases, the fraction of households willing 
to purchase it increases. It also reflects aver-
sion to risk—households demand insurance 
at actuarially unfair prices.
2.1 Out-of-Sample Predictions
Understanding the underlying structure 
of risk preferences matters for making out-
of-sample predictions. Consider a regulatory 
proposal to require all insurance policies to 
carry a deductible  d < L . In order to assess 
this proposal, we need to know how the 
demand for insurance would respond to the 
introduction of the deductible  d . The demand 
function for full insurance  Q F (p) —which we 
observe—provides, by itself, limited infor-
mation about the market-demand function 
for deductible insurance,  Q D (p) . However, 
if we know the underlying model that gen-
erates  Q F (p) , we can use that model to 
construct  Q D (p) .
Assume for the moment that the under-
lying model is EU. In addition, assume 
that (i) the utility function exhibits con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA), specif-
ically  u(y) = − exp (−ry)/r , where  r is the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion; and 
(ii) the slope of the demand function  Q D (p) 
arises from heterogeneity in  r . Given these 
assumptions, we can recover the population 
distribution of  r , denoted  F EU , from the mar-
ket-demand function  Q F (p) . Observe that a 
household’s willingness to pay for full insur-
ance is the  z such that3 
(1)  exp (rz)  = μ exp (rL)  + (1 − μ) . 
3 For an arbitrary utility function,  z is defined implicitly 
by  u(w − z)  = μu(w − L)  + (1 − μ) u(w) , where  w is the 
household’s status quo wealth. 
Equation (1) defines  r F (z) —the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion of a household 
with willingness to pay  z for full insurance. 
A household purchases full insurance when 
its  r >  r F (p) , and hence the demand for full 
insurance satisfies  Q F (p) = 1 −  F EU (  r F (p)) . 
It follows that, given  Q F (p) , we can recover 
F EU . Panel B of figure 1 displays the  F EU 
that corresponds to the  Q F (p) depicted in 
panel A.
Given  F EU , it is straightforward to con-
struct the demand for deductible insurance 
Q D (p) . A household’s willingness to pay for 
deductible insurance is the  z such that 
(2)  μ exp (r(z + d)) + (1 − μ) exp (rz)  
    = μ exp (rL)  + (1 − μ) . 
Equation (2) defines  r D (z) —the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion of a household with 
willingness to pay  z for deductible insur-
ance. A household purchases deductible 
insurance when its  r >  r D (p) , and hence 
the demand for deductible insurance is 
 Q EU D (p)  = 1 −  F EU (  r D (p)) . Panel C of fig-
ure 1 depicts the  Q EU D (p) that corresponds 
to the  Q F (p) depicted in panel A, assuming 
d = 2,500 . Because deductible insurance 
provides less coverage than full insurance, 
naturally  Q EU D (p)  <  Q F (p) .
Making a different assumption about the 
underlying model, however, can lead to differ-
ent predictions about the level of demand for 
deductible insurance. Suppose, for example, 
that the underlying model is the probability 
distortion model featured in Barseghyan et 
al. (2013b). The probability distortion model 
posits that households, instead of weighting 
outcomes by their objective probabilities, 
weight outcomes using distorted probabili-
ties.4 Under the probability distortion model 
4 In the setting of our example, such probability dis-
tortions can emerge from several prominent alternative 
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(and maintaining the additional assumptions 
specified above), a household’s willingness to 
pay for full insurance is the  z such that 
(3)  exp (rz)  = Ω(μ) exp (rL)  + (1 − Ω(μ)) ,  
where  Ω(μ) is the weight on the loss out-
come. Suppose that  Ω(μ) =  Ω ̅ > μ is the 
same across households, and that  Ω ̅ is known. 
models of choice under risk. See section 4.4 for further 
discussion. 
Given  Ω ̅ , we can proceed as before to use 
the known demand for full insurance  Q F (p) 
to construct the counterfactual demand for 
deductible insurance  Q Ω D (p) .
Let  F Ω denote the distribution of  r 
given the probability distortion model 
with loss weight  Ω ̅ . We can recover  F Ω 
from the demand for full insurance, 
Q F (p)  = 1 −  F Ω (  r Ω F (p)) , where  r Ω F (z) is 
defined by equation (3) with  Ω(μ)  =  Ω ̅ . 
Panel B of figure 1 displays the  F Ω that cor-
responds to the  Q F (p) depicted in panel A, 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1,000
1,500
2,000
p
p
QF(p)
Q(p)
F
(r
)
Panel A: Demand for full insurance
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 × 10
−40
0.5
1
r
Panel B: Implied distribution of the risk-aversion coefcient
FEU
FΩ
QEU (p)
QΩ (p)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
Panel C: Demand for deductible insurance
D
D
Figure 1. Demand for Insurance and Underlying Risk Preferences
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assuming  Ω ̅ = 0.10 . Given  F Ω , we can 
 construct the demand for deductible insur-
ance,  Q Ω D (p)  = 1 −  F Ω (  r Ω D (p)) , where  r Ω D (z) 
is defined by 
   Ω ̅ exp (r(z + d))  + (1 −  Ω ̅ ) exp (rz)
    =  Ω ̅ exp (rL)  + (1 −  Ω ̅ ), 
the equation that implicitly defines a house-
hold’s willingness to pay  z for deductible 
insurance. Panel C of figure 1 depicts 
the  Q Ω D (p) that corresponds to the  Q F (p) 
depicted in panel A, assuming  d = 2,500 and 
Ω ̅ = 0.10 . Observe that  Q Ω D (p)  <  Q EU D (p) .
In short, we see that the two models gen-
erate different predictions for the level of 
demand for deductible insurance. In partic-
ular, the EU model predicts a higher level 
of demand than the probability distortion 
model. The intuition for this difference 
follows from the nature of concave utility. 
Under both models, a concave utility func-
tion implies that the concern for reducing 
risk is stronger the more risk one bears.5 
Moreover, this effect becomes stronger as 
the concavity of the utility function increases 
(i.e., as  r gets larger). For a given (observed) 
demand for actuarially unfair full insurance, 
the concavity of the utility function is greater 
under the EU model than under the proba-
bility distortion model with  Ω(μ)  > μ ,6 and 
thus the implied demand for deductible 
insurance is greater under the EU model.
5 Take our example: although the deductible insurance 
provides 75 percent of the coverage of full insurance, 
under both modes a household’s willingness to pay for the 
deductible insurance is greater than 75 percent of the will-
ingness to pay for full insurance (see figure 1). 
6 Intuitively, this is because under the EU model a 
household’s aversion to risk (which generates its insur-
ance demand) is driven solely by the concavity of its utility 
function, whereas under the probability distortion model 
a household’s aversion to risk is driven also by the over-
weighting of its distortion function. 
2.2 Welfare Analysis
Understanding the underlying structure of 
risk preferences is also important for welfare 
analysis. There are two key issues here.
First, when one uses a structural model 
of preferences to conduct welfare analysis, 
a misspecified model can yield misleading 
conclusions. In simple terms, if a misspeci-
fied model leads to incorrect out-of-sample 
predictions for the behavioral impact of a 
policy change (as in the prior subsection), 
then of course welfare conclusions will be 
misleading. However, even if the misspec-
ified model leads to correct predictions for 
the behavioral impact of a particular policy 
change, it still can yield misleading conclu-
sions when one uses any welfare analysis 
that involves interpersonal utility compari-
sons (e.g., conducting welfare analysis based 
on sum of surplus). In particular, different 
underlying models can have different impli-
cations for the change in surplus that each 
person experiences from a particular policy 
change (even while agreeing on the direction 
of the change).
Second, economists sometimes conduct 
welfare analysis without reference to the 
underlying structure of preferences, using 
the fact that market demand (or more gener-
ally, people’s revealed willingness to pay) can 
be a sufficient statistic for consumer welfare.7 
For instance, Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen 
(2010) propose an approach to empirical wel-
fare analysis in insurance markets that relies 
only on estimating the demand function. 
However, this type of welfare analysis is valid 
only if people’s revealed willingness to pay 
is indeed a sufficient statistic for consumer 
welfare. The behavioral economics literature 
has suggested a variety of reasons people’s 
7 Such analyses are confined to within-sample wel-
fare analysis, because without an underlying model of 
preferences, one cannot make out-of-sample behavioral 
predictions. 
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behavior might deviate from what maximizes 
their welfare. Indeed, Baicker, Mullainathan, 
and Schwartzstein (2015) describe how the 
standard  revealed-preference approach to 
welfare might fail in the context of health 
insurance.
The question of whether and, if so, when 
we should drop the revealed-preference 
assumption in welfare analysis has been hotly 
debated—see, in particular, Ko˝szegi and 
Rabin (2008), Bernheim (2009), and Chetty 
(2015). Estimating the underlying structure 
of preferences can help frame this debate 
because the more one understands the 
forces that drive behavior, the better one can 
assess whether those forces should be given 
normative weight. To illustrate in the context 
of risk preferences, suppose we estimate that 
a probability distortion model (as described 
in section 2.1) best explains behavior, and 
suppose we are able to further establish that 
probability distortions primarily reflect risk 
misperceptions (i.e., incorrect subjective 
beliefs). We have then reframed the debate 
into one about whether we should evaluate 
welfare using a person’s (incorrect) subjec-
tive beliefs or more objective probabilities.
3. Models of Risk Preferences
In this section we describe in detail sev-
eral models of risk preferences. We begin 
by reviewing the standard EU model. We 
then proceed to introduce several alternative 
models. Our goal is not to provide an exhaus-
tive list, but rather to focus on models of risk 
preferences that have been prominent in the 
literature that uses field data to estimate risk 
preferences.8
We start by introducing notation that we 
use throughout this section.
8 In the online appendix, we provide further details 
about these models and illustrate their differences by 
describing their predictions in three examples. 
DEFINITION 1: Let  X ≡ ( x 1 ,  μ 1 ;  x 2 ,  μ 2 ; … ; 
 x N ,  μ N ) denote a lottery that yields outcome 
 x n with probability  μ n , where  ∑ n=1 N  μ n = 1 .
Models of risk preferences describe how a 
person chooses among lotteries of this form, 
where we often use  X to denote a choice set. 
Throughout, we express lottery outcomes 
in terms of increments added to (or sub-
tracted from) the person’s prior wealth  w . 
In other words, if outcome  x n is realized, 
then the person will have final wealth 
 w +  x n . The probabilities should be taken to 
be a person’s subjective beliefs. In particular, 
the models below describe how a person’s 
subjective beliefs impact his or her choices. 
The models are silent on the source of those 
subjective beliefs—we return to this issue in 
section 5.1.
3.1 Expected Utility
According to EU theory, given a choice set 
X , a person will choose the option  X ∈ X that 
maximizes
  EU(X)  ≡  ∑ 
n=1 
N
  μ n u(w +  x n ), 
where  u is a utility function that maps final 
wealth onto the real line.
Under EU theory, a person’s attitude 
toward risk is fully captured by her util-
ity function  u (and her prior wealth  w ). In 
broad terms, a person will be risk averse if  u 
is concave, risk loving if  u is convex, and risk 
neutral if  u is linear. More narrowly, one can 
derive a local measure of absolute or relative 
risk aversion (or risk lovingness) that char-
acterizes how a person will react locally to 
choices between lotteries.
Hence, when one estimates an EU model, 
the main object to estimate is the utility 
function  u . As we shall see, occasionally 
researchers have taken a nonparametric 
approach to estimating  u , but most often 
they assume a specific parametric functional 
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form for  u . Perhaps the most common func-
tional forms are the constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA), the constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA), and the hyperbolic abso-
lute risk aversion (HARA) families, reported 
in panel A of table 1. 
When one uses the CARA family, one 
estimates the parameter  r , which is the coef-
ficient of absolute risk aversion (higher  r 
means more risk averse). The CARA family 
implies a person’s prior wealth  w is irrelevant 
to her choices. This is advantageous from 
the econometrician’s  viewpoint, because  w 
frequently is unobserved. At the same time, 
however, this is disadvantageous from the 
economic theorist’s viewpoint, because econ-
omists typically believe that people exhibit 
decreasing absolute risk aversion—i.e., as a 
person becomes wealthier, she becomes less 
averse to risk.
TABLE 1 
Functional Forms Used in this Review
Panel A. Utility functions
CARA
 u(y)  =  { − 1 __r exp (−ry) for any r ≠ 0   y for r = 0 
CRRA
 u(y)  =  { 
 1 ___ 
1 − ρ  y 1−ρ  for any ρ ≠ 1  
ln  y
 
for ρ = 1 
HARA
 u(y)  =  
⎧
 
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 γ ___ 1 − γ  (η +  
y
 __γ) 
1−γ
 
 
for any γ ≠ 1
   
γ ln (η +  y __γ) 
 
for γ = 1
  
NTD  u ̃ (Δ)  ≡  u(w + Δ) ______
 u ′ (w)
 −  u(w) ____
 u ′ (w)
 ≅ Δ −  r __ 
2
 Δ 2  
Panel B. Probability weighting functions
Karmarkar (1978)  π(μ)  =   μ γ  ________ 
 μ γ +  (1 − μ) γ  
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)  π(μ)  =   μ γ  ___________  
 [ μ γ +  (1 − μ) γ ] 1/γ 
 
Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992)  π(μ)  =  δ  μ γ  _________  δ  μ γ +  (1 − μ) γ  
Prelec (1998)  π(μ)  = exp (− (−ln μ) α ) 
Panel C. Value function
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
  v(y)  =  {  y 
α 
 
for y ≥ 0,  α ∈ (0, 1)
   − λ  (− y) β  for y < 0,  β ∈ (0, 1),  λ > 1 
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When one uses the CRRA family, one 
estimates the parameter  ρ , which is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (higher  ρ 
means more risk averse). The CRRA  family 
has the advantage of implying decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (among those who are 
risk averse). However, the CRRA family has 
the major drawback that it requires prior 
wealth  w as an input. Hence, when research-
ers use the CRRA family and do not observe 
prior wealth, they typically either posit some 
reasonable value for prior wealth (and check 
robustness for other values) or proxy for 
wealth using some aspect of the data (e.g., 
home value).
Finally, when one uses the HARA fam-
ily, one estimates the parameters  η and  γ , 
which together determine the degree of 
absolute risk aversion  r(y)  =  (η + y / γ) −1 . 
The HARA family has the property that it 
nests the CARA and CRRA families as spe-
cial cases, with  γ → +∞ yielding CARA and 
η = 0 yielding CRRA.9
A third technique is to use an approxima-
tion approach; see Cohen and Einav (2007), 
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011), 
and Barseghyan et al. (2013b). Specifically, 
if one takes a second-order Taylor approxi-
mation of the utility function around prior 
wealth  w and then normalizes by mar-
ginal utility evaluated at prior wealth  w , 
one gets
(4)  u ̃ (Δ)  ≡  u(w + Δ) _______
u′(w) −  u(w) ____u′(w) ≅ Δ −  r __ 2  Δ 2 ,  
where  r ≡ − u″(w)/u′(w) is local absolute 
risk aversion. This approximation is accurate 
when the third- and higher-order derivatives 
of the utility function  u are negligible, at least 
relative to the increments to wealth that are 
9 Some researchers—e.g., Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) 
and Jullien and Salanié (2000)—assume a simpler HARA 
specification  u(y)  =  (η + y) γ . This simplification necessi-
tates restricting  γ to lie in the interval  (0, 1 ] . 
relevant in a particular application. As such, 
we label this approach the negligible third 
derivative (NTD) approach.
The NTD family is convenient to work 
with because it does not require prior 
wealth as an input. However, one must be 
careful to assess whether the approximation 
method is appropriate for the particular 
application under consideration. This will 
depend on the magnitude of the increments 
to wealth relative to the estimated degree of 
risk aversion.10
3.1.1 Utility Curvature and the Rabin 
 Critique
As it is usually applied—and as it is 
described above—EU theory is defined for 
static choices wherein a person faces a sin-
gle decision problem that involves choosing 
between lotteries that add to or subtract 
from her initial wealth.11 For such choices, 
Rabin (2000) demonstrates that if one 
assumes that a person uses the same util-
ity function in every choice—an assump-
tion one would want to make if the theory 
is to have any predictive power—then EU 
theory is problematic. In particular, Rabin 
demonstrates that if a person exhibits any 
noticeable risk aversion over small stakes 
for a range of initial wealth, then she must 
exhibit extremely large risk aversion over 
moderate stakes for that same range of ini-
tial wealth, so large as to be clearly coun-
terfactual. For instance, if a person rejects 
a 50–50 gamble to lose $10 and win $10.10 
for any initial wealth, then she must also 
reject a 50–50 gamble to lose $1,000 and 
win any positive sum, no matter how large. 
Because people arguably do exhibit notice-
able risk aversion over small stakes, but 
10 One obvious concern is that utility must be increas-
ing, which for risk averse individuals (with  r > 0 ) holds 
only for  Δ < 1 / r . 
11 Under EU theory, one can equivalently convert this 
problem into a static choice between lotteries defined over 
final wealth states. 
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also reasonable risk aversion over  moderate 
stakes, Rabin concludes that EU theory 
cannot be a good explanation for  behavior. 
This argument is known as the “Rabin 
critique.”
Motivated by the Rabin critique, parts of 
the empirical literature have focused on cali-
brational “rejections” of EU theory, by which 
they mean a finding of too much utility cur-
vature over small or moderate stakes. In our 
review of the literature, we describe some 
examples of such calibrational rejections, 
where authors conclude that the estimated 
degree of utility curvature is “too large.” We 
also attempt to clearly distinguish when EU 
theory is being rejected for calibrational rea-
sons and when it is being rejected because an 
alternative model statistically better explains 
the data.
One possible response to the Rabin cri-
tique is that the static EU framework is 
merely a simplification, as people are in fact 
solving dynamic life-cycle problems with 
many decisions taking place over time. If 
we think of the static EU framework as an 
“as-if” way of analyzing one of these many 
decisions, it becomes less clear that we 
should be applying the same utility function 
to every decision that the person makes. 
For instance, for some decisions uncer-
tainty resolves quickly (such as horse race 
bets or laboratory gambles), while for other 
decisions uncertainly resolves more slowly 
(such as property-insurance choices), and 
thus it is not obvious that the same utility 
function should apply to all decisions. It is 
an open question how to think about the 
comparability of utility functions estimated 
in different contexts. We return to this issue 
in section 7.1.
3.2 Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
Rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) 
theory emerged from a tradition in psychol-
ogy of relaxing the feature of EU theory that 
outcomes are weighted by their  probabilities. 
In other words, we replace the EU equation 
with
  V(X)  ≡  ∑ 
n=1 
N
  ω n u(w +  x n ), 
where  ω n is a decision weight associated 
with outcome  x n and may not be equal to a 
person’s belief  μ n . The original idea was pro-
posed by Edwards (1955, 1962) and popu-
larized in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory, which assumes  ω n = π(  μ n ) . 
That is, there is an increasing function  π —
often labeled a probability weighting func-
tion—that transforms each probability into 
a decision weight (still normalizing  π(0)  = 0 
and  π(1)  = 1 ). With this formulation, how-
ever, for any  π(μ)  ≠ μ , it is possible to con-
struct examples in which the theory predicts 
violations of stochastic dominance—i.e., that 
people would choose a lottery over another 
that stochastically dominates it. The source 
of such predictions is that, unlike under EU 
theory, when evaluating lotteries, the weights 
need not sum to one.12
Quiggin (1982) proposed a rank- 
dependent model to solve this problem. 
Under the rank-dependent approach, when 
evaluating a lottery  X ≡ ( x 1 ,  μ 1 ;  x 2 ,  μ 2 ; … , 
 x N ,  μ N ) , a person first ranks the outcomes 
from best to worst. Specifically, if the out-
comes are ordered such that  x 1 <  x 2 < ⋯ <  x N , then the weight on outcome  n is
 ω n =  
⎧
 
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
π(  μ 1 )
 
for n = 1
   π ( ∑ j=1 n  μ j ) − π ( ∑ j=1 n−1  μ j )  for n ∈ { 2,…, N − 1} 
1 − π ( ∑ j=1 n−1  μ j ) 
 
for n = N
 , 
12 For instance, if  π(1 / 3)  > 1 / 3 , then there exists  y ̅ > 0 
such that the model predicts a person would choose the 
lottery  (x, 1 /3; x − y, 1 / 3; x − 2y, 1 / 3) over the lottery 
(x, 1) for all  y ∈ (0,  y ̅) . 
511Barseghyan et al.: Estimating Risk Preferences in the Field
where  π is a probability weighting function. 
With this approach, when evaluating a lot-
tery, the weights sum to one by  construction, 
and there are no violations of stochastic 
dominance.13
The implications of RDEU theory, of 
course, depend on the specific probability 
weighting function that is used. The litera-
ture—in large part based on experimental 
results—has emphasized an inverse-S-
shaped probability weighting function: for 
small  μ ,  π(μ) is concave and has  π(μ)  > μ , 
while for large  μ ,  π(μ) is convex and has 
π(μ)  < μ .
Beyond the general inverse-S shape, a 
number of parameterized functional forms 
have been proposed in the literature on 
probability weighting. Some prominent func-
tional forms are reported in panel B of table 
1,14 and depicted in figure 2.15 Note two fea-
tures of these functions. First, except for the 
Karmarkar function, they are not symmetric 
around  μ = 1 / 2 , but rather they typically 
cross the forty-five-degree line at  μ < 1/ 2 . 
Second, the functions exhibit excess steep-
ness near  μ = 0 and  μ = 1 —in the sense of 
π′(μ)  >> 1 . In fact, in their original discus-
sion of probability weighting, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) instead suggested that 
probability weighting is discontinuous at 
13 While some view rank dependence as merely a tech-
nicial solution, others attempt to offer intuitive arguments 
for rank dependence (e.g., Diecidue and Wakker 2001). 
14 To be precise, Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992) 
propose the functional form 
 π( μ i |  μ −i ) =  δ  μ i γ  __________ δ  μ i γ +  ∑ j≠i  μ j γ , i = 1, … , N, 
with  μ −i denoting the entries of the probability vector  μ 
other than  μ i . For  N = 2, the above expression coincides 
with what appears in table 1, and that functional form 
(used also in the case of  N > 2 ) is commonly referred to in 
the literature as the Lattimore, Baker, and Witte function. 
15 Figure 2 closely parallels figure 1 from Prelec (1998). 
As in that figure, we use  α = 0.65 for the Prelec function 
and  γ = 0.61 for the Tversky and Kahnemann function. For 
the Lattimore, Baker, and Witte function, we use  δ = 0.77 
and  γ = 0.44 , which are estimates from Gonzalez and Wu 
(1999). For the Karmarkar function, we use  γ = 0.50 . 
the endpoints, reflecting a notion that as the 
probability of an event gets small enough, 
people ignore that possible event. The sub-
sequent literature seems to have introduced 
the excess steepness near  μ = 0 and  μ = 1 
to eliminate this discontinuity. However, it 
is unclear how much evidence there is for 
this excess steepness. As we shall see, in 
field applications, it is important to assess 
whether and how low-probability events 
are incorporated into a person’s decision 
calculations.
3.3 Cumulative Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) pros-
pect theory has two key features: probabil-
ity weighting and loss aversion. As discussed 
above, probability weighting derived from 
an older tradition in psychology, and is fully 
incorporated into RDEU theory. Loss aver-
sion represents a second departure from 
the EU model: instead of a utility function 
u defined over final wealth, there is a value 
function  v defined over gains and losses rela-
tive to some reference point.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose 
an improved version of their theory, labeled 
“cumulative prospect theory” (CPT). CPT 
requires as an input a reference outcome  s , 
and each outcome is coded as a gain or 
loss relative to this reference outcome.16 
Consider a lottery  X ≡ ( x 1 ,  μ 1 ; … ;  x N ,  μ N ) 
and a reference point  s , and suppose 
x 1 < ⋯ <  x  n ̅−1 ≤ s <  x  n ̅ < ⋯ <  x N . Under 
CPT, this lottery is evaluated as
  V(X; r)  ≡  ∑ 
n=1 
N
  ω n v(  x n − s) , 
16 The discussion will focus on a reference outcome 
expressed in increments to wealth, and thus the com-
parison is  x to  s . One could equivalently use a reference 
outcome expressed in final wealth, in which case the com-
parison would be  (w + x) to  s —i.e., the value function 
v(x − s) would be replaced with  v((w + x)  − s) . 
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where the weight on outcome  x n is
 ω n  =  
⎧
 
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
 π − (  μ 1 )
 
for n = 1
    
 π − ( ∑ j=1 n  μ j ) −  π − ( ∑ j=1 n−1  μ j ) 
 
for n ∈ { 2, ...,  n ̅− 1}
 
 π + ( ∑ j=n N  μ j ) −  π + ( ∑ j=n+1 N  μ j ) for n ∈ { n ̅, ..., N − 1}
 π + (  μ N ) for n = N
 . 
In this formulation,  π − and  π + are prob-
ability weighting functions applied to the 
loss and gain events, respectively. Thus, the 
 theory permits differential weighting for 
gains and losses.17
The value function  v is assumed to have 
three key properties: (i)  v(0)  = 0 and it 
assigns positive value to gains and negative 
value to losses; (ii) it is concave over gains 
and convex over losses (often labeled “dimin-
ishing sensitivity”); and (iii) it is steeper in 
17 If  π + (μ)  = 1 −  π − (1 − μ) , then the distinction 
between  π − and  π + becomes irrelevant. 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
μ
pi(
μ)
Karmarkar (1978)
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992)
Prelec (1998)
Figure 2. Probability Weighting Functions
513Barseghyan et al.: Estimating Risk Preferences in the Field
the loss domain than in the gain domain 
(often labeled “loss aversion”).
To estimate a CPT model, one often needs 
functional form assumptions (although occa-
sionally researchers have attempted more 
nonparametric approaches). In terms of 
the probability weighting functions  π − and 
π + , the CPT literature has used the same 
functional forms as the RDEU literature—
indeed, the Tversky and Kahneman function 
reported in panel B of table 1 was suggested 
as part of CPT. The value function pro-
posed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is 
reported in panel C of table 1. In that spec-
ification,  α ∈ (0, 1) and  β ∈ (0, 1) generate 
diminishing sensitivity in the gain and loss 
domains, respectively. The parameter  λ > 1 
reflects loss aversion, as it implies the nega-
tive value generated by a loss is greater than 
the positive value generated by an equally 
sized gain. Based on their experimental data, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggest that 
λ = 2.25 ,  α = β = 0.88 , and for their prob-
ability weighting function,  γ − = 0.69 and 
γ + = 0.61 .
When applying CPT, researchers must 
specify a reference point, and typically this 
is done using some external intuitive argu-
ment. For instance, in experiments it is typi-
cally argued that the reference point should 
be zero or experimentally endowed wealth. 
In field settings, researchers often argue for 
a natural reference point given the setting 
(e.g., in his recent analysis of tax evasion, 
Rees-Jones 2018 argues that a zero bal-
ance due is a natural reference point). This 
extra “degree of freedom” in CPT is often 
seen as a limitation and it has led to various 
ideas about how to tie down the reference 
point.
3.4 Expectations-Based Models
A class of “expectations-based” models 
advances the idea that expectations about 
outcomes set reference points and influence 
choices.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) propose a 
model of loss aversion in which the reference 
point is taken to be one’s expectations about 
outcomes. Moreover, because such expecta-
tions could involve uncertainty about future 
outcomes, they extend the model of loss 
aversion to use a reference lottery instead of 
a reference outcome.
Specifically, under Ko˝szegi–Rabin (KR) 
loss aversion, the utility from choosing lot-
tery  X ≡  (  x n ,  μ n ) n=1 N given a reference lottery 
X ̃ ≡  (  x ̃m ,  μ ̃ m ) m=1 M is 
 V(X| X ̃ ) ≡  ∑ 
n=1 
N
  ∑ 
m=1 
M
  μ n  μ ̃ m 
×  [u(w +  x n ) + v(w +  x n |w +  x ̃m )] . 
The function  u represents standard “intrin-
sic” utility defined over final wealth, just as 
in EU. The function  v represents “gain–loss” 
utility that results from experiencing gains or 
losses relative to the reference lottery. Gain–
loss utility depends on how a realized out-
come  x n is compared to all possible outcomes 
that could have occurred in the reference 
lottery. For the value function, KR use 
 v(y| y ̃ ) =  { η [u(y) − u( y ̃ )]  if u(y) > u( y ̃ )   ηλ [u(y)  − u( y ̃ )]  if u(y)  ≤ u( y ̃ ) . 
In this formulation, the magnitude of gain–
loss utility is determined by the intrinsic 
utility gain or loss relative to consuming the 
reference point. Moreover, gain–loss utility 
takes a two-part linear form, where  η ≥ 0 
captures the importance of gain–loss utility 
relative to intrinsic utility and  λ ≥ 1 captures 
loss aversion. The model reduces to EU 
when  η = 0 or  λ = 1 .
KR propose that the reference lottery 
equals recent expectations about out-
comes—i.e., if a person expects to face 
 lottery  X ̃ , then her reference lottery becomes 
X ̃ . However, because situations vary in terms 
of when a person deliberates about and then 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LVI (June 2018)514
commits to her choices, KR offer multiple 
solution concepts for the determination of 
the reference lottery. Here, we focus on two 
solution concepts that are perhaps most rele-
vant for field data.
DEFINITION 2 (KR–PPE): Given a choice 
set X, a lottery  X ∈ X is a personal equilib-
rium if for all  X′ ∈ X ,  V(X | X)  ≥ V(X′|X) , and 
it is a preferred personal equilibrium if there 
does not exist another  X′ ∈ X such that  X′ is a 
personal equilibrium and  V(X′|X′) > V(X | X) . 
DEFINITION 3 (KR–CPE): Given a 
choice set X, a lottery  X ∈ X is a choice- 
acclimating personal equilibrium if for all 
 X′ ∈ X ,  V(X | X)  ≥ V(X′|X′) . 
KR suggest that PPE is appropriate 
when, faced with a choice set  X , a person 
thinks about the choice situation, decides 
on a planned choice  X ∈ X , and then makes 
that choice shortly before the uncertainty is 
resolved. An option  X is a personal equilib-
rium if, when a person plans on that option 
and thus that option determines her refer-
ence lottery, it is indeed optimal to make that 
choice. Among the set of personal equilib-
ria, the PPE is the personal equilibrium that 
yields the highest “utility.” In terms of field 
contexts, then, PPE is an appropriate solu-
tion concept when a person is able to think 
about a choice situation for some duration 
and then make a choice shortly before the 
uncertainty is resolved. Among those that we 
discuss in sections 5 and 6, the field context 
that perhaps best fits this scenario is betting 
on horse races.
The idea behind CPE is that, when faced 
with a choice set  X , a person commits to a 
choice well in advance of the resolution of 
uncertainty. By the time the uncertainty is 
resolved, the person will have become accus-
tomed to her choice and hence expect the 
lottery induced by her choice. Hence, the 
person chooses the lottery that yields the 
largest utility conditional on that lottery being 
the reference lottery. Two field  contexts in 
which a person commits to a choice well in 
advance of the resolution of uncertainty are 
property insurance and health insurance.
When estimating the KR model, one 
needs to estimate the parameters  η and  λ 
along with the utility function  u(y) . Because 
the latter is meant to be standard utility over 
final wealth, as in EU, any of the functional 
forms for  u(y) in table 1 might be used.
Models of “disappointment aversion” also 
assume that choices are influenced by expec-
tations. The concept of disappointment aver-
sion was proposed by Bell (1985) and further 
developed by Loomes and Sugden (1986) and 
Gul (1991). The basic idea is that one is dis-
appointed (or elated) if the realized outcome 
of a lottery is worse (or better) than expected.
Bell (1985) proposes a variant of disap-
pointment aversion in which disappointment 
is determined from a comparison of one’s 
realized utility to one’s EU, and the person 
accounts for expected disappointment when 
making a choice. Formally, a lottery  X ≡ 
(  x n ,  μ n ) n=1 N is evaluated as
 V(X)  =  ∑ 
n=1 
N
  μ n u(w +  x n ) 
− β  ∑ 
n=1 
N
  μ n [I (u(w +  x n ) <  U ̅ )  ( U ̅ − u(w +  x n )) ] , 
where  I is an indicator function and 
 U ̅ ≡  ∑ n=1 N  μ n u(w +  x n ) . The first term is the 
standard EU of lottery  X . The second term 
reflects the expected disutility from disap-
pointment that arises when the realized util-
ity from an outcome is less than the standard 
EU of the lottery. The parameter  β captures 
the magnitude of disappointment aversion, 
where the model reduces to EUfor  β = 0 .18
18 Bell (1985) further assumes that (i)  u(x)  = x , and (ii) 
a person might also experience utility from elation when 
the realized outcome is larger than the expected util-
ity. Even with the latter, however, his model reduces to 
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Gul (1991) proposes another variant of 
disappointment aversion in which disap-
pointment is determined from a comparison 
of one’s realized outcome to one’s certainty 
equivalent for the lottery. Formally, a lottery 
X ≡  (  x n ,  μ n ) n=1 N is evaluated as  V(X)  =  _ V
such that
 
_
 V =  ∑ 
n=1 
N
  μ n u(w +  x n ) 
− β  ∑ 
n=1 
N
  μ n [I (u(w +  x n ) <  
_
 V)  ( 
_
 V − u(w +  x n )) ] . 
The  z that solves  u(w + z)  =  _ V is one’s cer-
tainty equivalent for lottery  X in this model.
When Bell disappointment aversion is 
applied to binary lotteries, the model is 
equivalent to the KR–CPE model. Gul dis-
appointment aversion yields a slightly differ-
ent model, though the structure is still quite 
similar. (For equations in the binary insur-
ance case, see section 4.4.) For lotteries with 
more than two outcomes, the three models 
are more distinct. For details, see the online 
appendix.
When estimating models of disappoint-
ment aversion, one needs to estimate the 
parameter  β along with the utility function 
u(y) . Because the latter is standard utility 
over final wealth, as in EU, any of the func-
tional forms for  u(y) in table 1 might be used.
4. Model Predictions and Identification
Our goal in this section is to develop intu-
ition for the types of data that may yield 
point identification of a model’s parameters. 
Point identification obtains when, given any 
two distinct values for the parameter  vector 
the model in the text where  β represents the difference 
between the marginal disutility from disappointment and 
the marginal utility from elation. Loomes and Sugden 
(1986) also use this formulation, except they study nonlin-
ear disappointment. 
 characterizing the model, one has that the 
model (when applied with each of these 
parameter vectors) yields a different pre-
dicted distribution for the observable data.19 
The subsections below discuss, for each of 
the models presented in the prior section, 
the conditions under which the model’s 
parameters are point identified.
To facilitate our discussion, we focus 
throughout this section on the exam-
ple of households purchasing insurance. 
Specifically, we consider the situation in 
which a household incurs a loss  L with prob-
ability  μ , but also has the option to purchase 
insurance against this loss with a deductible 
d ≥ 0 . The willingness to pay  z for such an 
insurance policy must satisfy the indiffer-
ence condition
    (w − z, 1 − μ; w − z − d, μ)  
     ∼ (w, 1 − μ; w − L, μ) . 
Table 2 reports, for each of the models pre-
sented in the previous section, the equation 
implied by this indifference condition—i.e., 
the equation one would solve to obtain a 
value for  z .
In the empirical applications discussed in 
this review, typically the observable data are 
comprised of (i) a discrete choice set (e.g., a 
set of insurance products); (ii) the character-
istics of that choice set (e.g., the premiums 
associated with each insurance product); 
and (iii) the option selected from that choice 
set.20 The willingness to pay  z for an insur-
ance product is a useful tool in generating, 
for such discrete choice sets, the model-im-
plied joint distribution of premiums and opti-
mal choices. Consider, for instance, when 
the choice set is composed of two options, 
19 See Lewbel (2017) for a thorough discussion of iden-
tification in econometrics. 
20 In some cases, the data also contain some characteris-
tics of the household making the choice 
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the option to purchase a particular insurance 
product and the option to remain uninsured. 
If  z is the willingness to pay for the insurance 
product, then the model-implied joint dis-
tribution of premiums and optimal choices 
involves choosing the insurance for all pre-
miums less than  z and choosing no insurance 
for all premiums greater than  z .
To simplify the exposition (and notation), 
our discussion of identification assumes hav-
ing data on a population who share the same 
wealth  w , potential loss  L , and loss proba-
bility  μ . Insurance products are defined by 
their deductible  d —i.e., a choice set will be 
a set of available deductibles (and possibly 
also the option not to insure). The data will 
include, for each household, a premium asso-
ciated with each available deductible, along 
with the household’s choice. For such data, 
it is natural to use  z(d) to denote the will-
ingness to pay for insurance with deductible 
 d , supressing the fact that this willingness to 
pay also depends on  w ,  L , and  μ . Of course, 
in practice, there is heterogeneity in  w ,  L , 
and  μ (and other household characteristics). 
If these variables were observable, then all 
identification arguments below would hold 
conditional on these observables—indeed, 
as we’ll see the literature often views  μ as 
an observed variable. If these variables are 
unobserved, then identification can become 
somewhat more complicated—in this and 
subsequent sections, we discuss ways to 
deal with various forms of unobserved 
heterogeneity.
4.1 Expected Utility
We first consider point identification under 
EU. From table 2, under EU  z(d) satisfies 
  u(w − z(d)  − d)  − u(w − L) ________________ 
u(w)  − u(w − z(d)) =  
1 − μ ___μ . 
When estimating risk preferences, much 
of the literature assumes a parametric 
TABLE 2 
Willingness to Pay ( z ) for Insurance with Deductible d,  
against the Possibility of Losing  L with Probability  μ 
Model WTP
EU   μ u(w − d − z)  + (1 − μ) u(w − z)  =   μ u(w − L)  + (1 − μ) u(w) 
RDEU   π(μ) u(w − d − z)  + (1 − π(μ)) u(w − z)  =   π(μ) u(w − L)  + (1 − π(μ)) u(w) 
CPT   π − (μ) v(−d − z)  + (1 −  π − (μ)) v(−z)  =   π − (μ) v(−L) 
 KR-CPE   { μ [1 + Λ(1 − μ)] u(w − d − z)  =   { μ [1 + Λ(1 − μ)] u(w − L) 
  +  [1 − μ [1 + Λ(1 − μ)] ] u(w − z)}    +  [1 − μ [1 + Λ(1 − μ)] ] u(w)} 
Bell–DA   {μ [1 + β(1 − μ)] u(w − d − z)  =   {μ [1 + β(1 − μ)] u(w − L) 
  +  [1 − μ [1 + β(1 − μ)] ] u(w − z)}   +  [1 − μ [1 + β(1 − μ)] ] u(w)} 
Gul–DA      { (1 + β) μ _____1 + βμ u(w − d − z)  =   { (1 + β) μ _____1 + βμ u(w − L) 
  +  (1 −  (1 + β) μ _____1 + βμ ) u(w − z)}     +  (1 −  (1 + β) μ _____1 + βμ ) u(w)} 
Note: In KR–CPE,  Λ ≡ η(λ − 1) .
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 functional form for  u —e.g., CARA, CRRA, 
or NTD—with a single parameter capturing 
the magnitude of risk aversion. These func-
tional forms all fall in a class of utility func-
tions that satisfy assumption 1 below.
Denote by  u(y; ϕ) the parametric utility 
function, where  y is a final wealth state and  ϕ 
is a taste parameter. Assume that  u is contin-
uous in both  y > 0 and  ϕ ∈ ℝ , and that  ϕ = 0 
if and only if  u(y; ϕ)  = y . In addition, main-
tain the following.
ASSUMPTION 1: (i)  u(y; ϕ) is increas-
ing in  y , and for any  y 0 >  y 1 >  y 2 , the 
ratio  R ≡  [u( y 1 ; ϕ) − u( y 2 ; ϕ)] / [u( y 0 ; ϕ) − 
u(  y 1 ; ϕ)] is strictly increasing in  ϕ . (ii) 
lim ϕ→∞  R = ∞ and  lim ϕ→−∞  R = 0 .21
Assumption 1 naturally associates  ϕ 
with the magnitude of an individual’s risk 
aversion.22 In particular, assumption 1 
holds if and only if for any  y 0 >  y 1 >  y 2 
and  μ ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a  ϕ ̅ such that 
 (  y 0 , 1 − μ;  y 2 , μ)  ≻ (  y 1 , 1) for  ϕ ∈ [0,  ϕ ̅) , 
 (  y 0 , 1 − μ;  y 2 , μ)  ∼ (  y 1 , 1) for  ϕ =  ϕ ̅, and 
 (  y 0 , 1 − μ;  y 2 , μ)  ≺ (  y 1 , 1) for  ϕ >  ϕ ̅. In 
words, whenever a person compares a binary 
risky lottery to a certain amount in the inter-
val  (  y 0 ,  y 2 ) , the person chooses the riskier 
lottery if her risk aversion  ϕ is small enough, 
and she chooses the certain amount if her 
risk aversion  ϕ is high enough.
Consider the willingness to pay  z(  d 0 ) for 
one specific deductible  d 0 . Under EU, for 
any  u(y; ⋅ ) satisfying assumption 1, each 
preference parameter  ϕ implies a unique 
z(  d 0 ) , where the larger is  ϕ (the more risk 
21 The limit assumption is made merely to guarantee 
interior solutions in any formal results below. In practice, 
this assumption is unlikely to be important. NTD does not 
satisfy this assumption, but result 1, below, holds for NTD 
as well. 
22 Assumption 1 is equivalent to condition (e) in Pratt 
(1964 theorem 1). As shown there, it is equivalent to 
assuming that an increase in  ϕ corresponds to an increase 
in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
averse the household is) the larger is  z(  d 0 ) 
(the more the household is willing to pay 
for insurance). It follows that a data set in 
which all households make a choice between 
the same two options—insurance with 
deductible  d 0 versus no insurance—can be 
sufficient for point identification of  ϕ . In 
particular, because each  ϕ implies a unique 
 z(  d 0 ) , each  ϕ also implies a unique joint distri-
bution of premiums and optimal choices, and 
thus there is point identification as long as the 
data contain sufficient variation in premiums.
The literature most often assumes a para-
metric functional form for  u , not only when 
estimating EU but also when estimating the 
alternative models we discuss below. As we 
have seen, this assumption dramatically sim-
plifies identification, but it is a strong restric-
tion. It would be desirable to be able to trace 
out the utility function nonparametrically 
over the relevant support. Doing so can be 
straightforward if one is willing to assume 
homogeneous preferences (and has access to 
data exhibiting the type of variation described 
above). In practice, however, there is hetero-
geneity across households, and allowing for 
this heterogeneity dramatically complicates 
relaxing the parametric assumption on  u . We 
return to this issue in section 6.2.1.
4.2 Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
We next consider point identification 
under RDEU. From table 2, under RDEU 
z(d) satisfies
  u(w − z(d)  − d)  − u(w − L) ________________ 
u(w)  − u(w − z(d)) =  1 − π ___π , 
where we use  π in place of  π(μ) given our 
maintained assumption that all households 
have the same  μ .23
23 In other words, the relationship between  π and  μ 
plays no role in the discussion in this section. Hence, the 
identification results in this section also hold in an EU 
model when one attempts to estimate both risk aversion 
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In this case, model predictions depend on 
both the utility function  u and the decision 
weight  π , which complicates identification 
even when the utility function is parametri-
cally specified as  u(y; ϕ) . As above, consider 
the willingness to pay  z(  d 0 ) for one specific 
deductible  d 0 . Unlike above, it is not the case 
that each vector of preference parameters 
(ϕ, π) implies a unique  z(  d 0 ) . Rather, there 
is a set of  (ϕ, π) pairs consistent with  z(  d 0 ) . 
To illustrate, we define  π ̅(ϕ | d,  z ̅) to be the 
required  π as a function of  ϕ that generates 
willingness to pay  z(d)  =  z ̅. We can rear-
range the equality above to derive
 π ̅(ϕ | d,  z ̅) = 
 u(w; ϕ)  − u(w −  z ̅; ϕ)   __________________________________    [u(w; ϕ)  − u(w −  z ̅; ϕ)] +  [u(w −  z ̅ − d; ϕ)  − u(w − L; ϕ)] . 
Given this function, any preference–param-
eter pair  (ϕ,  π ̅(ϕ |  d 0 , z(  d 0 ))) is consistent with 
z(  d 0 ) . For any  u that satisfies assumption 1, 
 π ̅(ϕ |  d 0 , z(  d 0 )) is decreasing in  ϕ , as depicted 
in figure 3. Intuitively, both an increased risk 
aversion and an increased decision weight 
on the loss state imply an increased willing-
ness to pay for insurance. Hence, for a fixed 
willingness to pay, as risk aversion increases, 
the decision weight on the loss state must 
decline in order to keep the willingness to 
pay unchanged.
Hence, unlike for EU, under RDEU one 
cannot point identify the vector of prefer-
ence parameters  (ϕ, π) using a data set in 
which all households make a choice between 
the same two options. However, it can suf-
fice to observe households choosing between 
three options. For example, consider house-
holds choosing between no insurance, insur-
ance with deductible  d 0 , and insurance with 
ϕ and unobserved subjective beliefs (or unobserved risk 
types), where  π would be those subjective beliefs (or risk 
types). If instead one observes  μ and wants to identify the 
function  π( ⋅ ) over some range of values for  μ , one needs 
data as described in the text for all those values of  μ . 
deductible  d 1 >  d 0 . The willingness to pay 
z(  d 1 ) is consistent with another set of  (ϕ, π) 
pairs represented by the curve  π ̅(ϕ |  d 1 , z(  d 1 )) , 
again as depicted in figure 3. As we establish 
in result 1 below, these two curves cross at 
only one point, yielding a unique  (ϕ, π) pair 
consistent with both  z(  d 0 ) and  z(  d 1 ) .
RESULT 1: If  u(y; ϕ) satisfies assump-
tion 1, then for any  0 <  d 0 <  d 1 ≤ L there 
exists a unique  ϕ ̅ such that (i)  π ̅(ϕ|  d 0 , z(  d 0 )) =  π ̅(ϕ|  d 1 , z( d 1 )) and (ii)  π ̅(ϕ|  d 0 , z( d 0 )) < 
  π ̅(ϕ|  d 1 ,z( d 1 )) for all  ϕ <  ϕ ̅, and  π ̅(ϕ|  d 0 , 
z( d 0 ))  >  π ̅(ϕ|  d 1 , z(  d 1 )) for all  ϕ >  ϕ ̅.
PROOF:
First, note that because  u is increas-
ing in  y ,  z(  d 0 ) > z(  d 1 ) while  z(  d 0 ) +  d 0 < 
z(  d 1 ) +  d 1 (otherwise the household would 
violate dominance). Define  A(ϕ) ≡ u(w; ϕ) − 
u(w  −  z( d 0 ); ϕ) ,  B(ϕ) ≡ u(w − z( d 0 ) −  d 0 ; ϕ) − u(w − L; ϕ) ,  A ′ (ϕ) ≡ u(w; ϕ) − u(w  − 
z( d 1 ); ϕ) , and  B ′ (ϕ) ≡ u(w − z( d 1 ) −  d 1 ; ϕ) − 
u(w − L; ϕ) , in which case  π ̅(ϕ|  d 0 , z(  d 0 )) = A(ϕ)/ [A(ϕ)  + B(ϕ)] and  π ̅(ϕ|  d 1 , z(  d 1 )) =  A ′ (ϕ)/ [ A ′ (ϕ)  +  B ′ (ϕ)] . Hence
 
 π ̅(ϕ|  d 0 , z(  d 0 )) ≷  π ̅(ϕ|  d 1 , z(  d 1 )) 
 
    ⇔   A(ϕ) ________ 
A(ϕ)  + B(ϕ) ≷  
 A ′ (ϕ) ________ 
 A ′ (ϕ)  +  B ′ (ϕ)
     
 
 
               ⇔    B ′ (ϕ) ____
B(ϕ) ≷  
 A ′ (ϕ) ____
A(ϕ) .
  
After algebraic manipulations, assumption 1 
yields that  A ′ (ϕ)/A(ϕ) is a strictly decreasing 
function of  ϕ , where  lim ϕ→∞    A ′ (ϕ) ____A(ϕ)  = 0 and 
lim ϕ→−∞    A 
′ (ϕ) ____
A(ϕ) = 1 . Analogously, assumption 1 
yields that  B ′ (ϕ)/B(ϕ) is a strictly increasing 
function of  ϕ , where  lim ϕ→∞    B ′ (ϕ) ____B(ϕ) = 1 and 
lim ϕ→−∞    B 
′ (ϕ) ____
B(ϕ) = 0 . The result follows.  ∎ 
The key intuition behind result 1 is that 
probability distortions in isolation yield, for 
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instance, that the willingness to pay for full 
insurance is exactly double the willingness to 
pay to eliminate half the risk (in our exam-
ple, for  d = L / 2 ). On the other hand, for 
standard risk aversion ( ϕ ), the concern for 
reducing risk is stronger the more risk one 
bears, and so the willingness to pay for full 
insurance is less than double the willingness 
to pay to eliminate half the risk. Moreover, 
the larger one’s standard risk aversion is, the 
stronger this asymmetry will be. Hence, the 
ratio of the willingness to pay to reduce some 
of the risk relative to the willingness to pay 
to reduce more of the risk serves to identify 
how much standard risk aversion is present 
relative to how much distortion of probabili-
ties is at play. This intuition can be applied in 
other contexts, as well.
Result 1 shows that a pair  { z(  d 0 ), z(  d 1 )} 
determines a unique pair  (ϕ, π) .24 Conversely, 
24 Note that, for some values of  { z(  d 0 ), z(  d 1 )} , the 
unique  (ϕ, π) could have  ϕ < 0 (in which case preferences 
are risk loving). 
a pair  (ϕ, π) determines a unique pair 
 { z(  d 0 ), z(  d 1 )} and also a unique choice cor-
respondence  C(  p 0 ,  p 1 ) that captures the 
choice from the set  {  d 0 ,  d 1 } given premiums 
{  p 0 ,  p 1 } . In turn,  { z(  d 0 ), z(  d 1 )} and  C(  p 0 ,  p 1 ) 
determine a unique joint distribution of pre-
miums and optimal choices, and thus there is 
point identification as long as the data contain 
sufficient variation in premiums. It follows 
that a data set in which all households make 
a choice between the same three options—
insurance with deductible  d 0 , insurance with 
deductible  d 1 , and no insurance—can be 
sufficient for point identification of the pref-
erence parameters  (ϕ, π) , provided there is 
sufficient variation in premiums.
4.3 EU and RDEU with Unobserved 
Heterogeneity
The discussion above focuses on iden-
tification of the EU or RDEU preference 
 parameters for a population in which every-
one has the same preference parameters 
pi(ϕ|d1, z(d1))
L − d1
z(d1)
pi(ϕ|d0, z(d0))
ϕ
pi
L − d0
z(d0)
Figure 3. Identification in the RDEU Model
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(i.e., for a model with homogeneous pref-
erences or a model in which preferences 
depend on only observable characteristics). 
It is often important to permit unobserved 
heterogeneity in preference parameters (as 
we discuss more in section 5.1.2). How can 
one point identify the distribution of risk 
preferences in this case?
Intuitively, the researcher now needs to 
observe how the population (or at least a 
large enough representative subsample) 
allocates itself across the different options 
within a fixed menu, and moreover the 
researcher needs to observe this alloca-
tion for a sufficiently large set of different 
fixed menus. For the insurance context 
that we have been using in this section, this 
means that the researcher needs to observe 
data that identify the multinomial distri-
bution of chosen deductibles conditional 
on premiums, with sufficient variation in 
premiums (i.e., variation in the choice 
menu) to identify the distribution of risk 
preferences.
To illustrate, consider an EU model in the 
insurance context with a parametric utility 
function  u(y; ϕ) that satisfies assumption 1. 
Suppose that the choice set consists of three 
deductible options,  d A >  d B >  d C , with 
respective premiums  p A <  p B <  p C . Each 
p ≡ (  p A ,  p B ,  p C ) is a choice menu. One can 
show that a choice menu  p partitions the sup-
port of  ϕ in three regions— (−∞,  ϕ AB (p)); 
 (  ϕ AB (p),  ϕ BC (p)) ; and  (  ϕ BC (p),  ∞) —so 
that, when facing  p , individuals with  ϕ < 
ϕ AB (p) choose deductible  d A , individuals 
with  ϕ ∈ (  ϕ AB (p) ,  ϕ BC (p) ) choose deduct-
ible  d B , and individuals with  ϕ >  ϕ BC (p) 
choose deductible  d C .25 If we then let  F 
denote the cumulative distribution function 
of  ϕ , for a given  p the model predicts that 
25 Of course, for some  p , some of these intervals might 
be empty (which occurs when  p is such that an option is 
dominated). While the intuition extends in a straightfor-
ward way, for simplicity we ignore such  p here. 
a fraction  F(  ϕ AB (p)) chooses deductible  d A , 
a fraction  F(  ϕ BC (p))  − F(  ϕ AB (p)) chooses 
deductible  d B , and a fraction  1 − F(  ϕ BC (p)) 
chooses deductible  d C . The researcher then 
matches these predictions to the empirical 
multinomial distribution of chosen deduct-
ibles conditional on premiums  p , and thereby 
identifies the value of  F at two points. By 
repeating this exercise for a large number of 
choice menus,  F can be fully learned from the 
data. In particular, we need variation in  p that 
yields variation in  (  ϕ AB (p),  ϕ BC (p)) that spans 
the entire support of  ϕ, so that the entire dis-
tribution  F can be identified. We return to 
discussing this strategy in section 6.2.2.
If instead we consider an RDEU model, 
there are potentially two sources of unob-
served heterogeneity: in standard risk 
aversion  ϕ and in the decision weight  π . 
In principle, a similar approach to what 
was delineated for the EU model might be 
applied, building on the insight in figure 3. 
Suppose that the choice set consists of two 
deductible options,  d A >  d B , with respective 
premiums  p A <  p B , and also the option of no 
insurance. Each  (  p A ,  p B ) is a choice menu. 
Given  p A , the curve  π ̅(ϕ|  d A ,  p A ) partitions 
the  (ϕ, π) space into a region that prefers 
d A to no insurance and a region that pre-
fers no insurance to  d A . Given  p B , the curve 
 π ̅(ϕ|  d B ,  p B ) yields an analogous partition for 
d B versus no insurance. Finally, given the pair 
 (  p A ,  p B ) , one can add a third curve that par-
titions the  (ϕ, π) space into a region that pre-
fers  d A to  d B and a region that prefers  d B to 
d A . These three partitions can then be com-
bined to generate, as a function of  (  p A ,  p B ) , 
an overall partition of the  (ϕ, π) space into a 
region that chooses  d A , a region that chooses 
d B , and a region that chooses no insurance.26 
As above, the researcher can then match these 
predictions to the empirical  multinomial 
26 As above, for some  (  p A ,  p B ) , some of these regions 
might be empty (which occurs when  (  p A ,  p B ) is such that 
an option is dominated). 
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 distribution of chosen deductibles condi-
tional on premiums  (  p A ,  p B ) , and thereby 
obtain some information about the distribu-
tion of  (ϕ, π) . By repeating this exercise for a 
sufficiently large set of choice menus, the dis-
tribution can be learned from the data.
Nonetheless, to date, point identification 
of multidimensional heterogeneity in risk 
preferences has relied mostly upon paramet-
ric assumptions about their joint distribution. 
An interesting departure from this literature 
appears in Ericson et al. (2018), who build 
upon and expand the arguments here to pro-
vide results on nonparametric identification 
of unobserved heterogeneity in both risk 
aversion and risk, where “risk” can be inter-
preted as subjective beliefs. Their analysis 
can be related to ours observing that  π , as 
described in this section, can be interpreted 
as risk and can be learned without connecting 
it with claim probabilities  μ ; observation of  μ 
and variation in  μ are only needed to identify 
π as a function of  μ (see footnote 23).
4.4 Distinguishing More Complex Models
Finally, we discuss identification of more 
complex models that include additional 
sources of aversion to risk—e.g., KR loss 
aversion or disappointment aversion (DA)—
and perhaps multiple sources at the same 
time. We organize our discussion in two 
parts. First, we consider contexts in which 
households only make choices over binary 
lotteries. Then we consider contexts in which 
households make choices over lotteries with 
more than two outcomes.
If the data contains only choices over 
binary lotteries  X ≡ (  x 1 , μ;  x 2 , 1 − μ) , with 
x 1 <  x 2 , then all models considered in sec-
tion 3 (except for CPT and KR–PPE) can be 
reduced to one in which a household chooses 
the lottery that maximizes 
(5)   U(X)  = Ω(μ) u(w +  x 1 ) 
 + (1 − Ω(μ)) u(w +  x 2 ),  
where  Ω(μ) is a probability distortion func-
tion, as in Barseghyan et al. (2013b). In the 
online appendix, we show that the function 
Ω(μ) may take one of the following forms:
 
Under RDEU:
 
Ω(μ) = π(μ);
   
Under KR–CPE:
 
Ω(μ) = μ(1 + Λ(1 − μ));
 
Under Bell–DA:
 Ω(μ) = μ(1 + β(1 − μ)); 
Under Gul–DA
 
Ω(μ) = (1 + β)μ/(1 + βμ).27
 
Hence, even if one has data that allows for 
nonparametric point identification of  Ω(μ) , 
the underlying models can be distinguished 
only to the extent that they impose different 
restrictions on  Ω(μ) . Clearly, KR–CPE and 
Bell–DA cannot be distinguished from each 
other. Each of KR–CPE/Bell–DA and Gul–
DA impose strong parametric assumptions, 
and so does RDEU if a parametric functional 
form is assumed for  π(μ) (e.g., any of those 
in table 1). With these parametric assump-
tions, the models can be tested to find which 
best fits the data. However, a more flexible 
approach would allow for nonparametric 
probability weighting. If either loss aversion 
or disappointment aversion are also per-
mitted, identification of the resulting  Ω(μ) 
function would not allow one to disentangle 
these sources of aversion to risk. For exam-
ple, KR–CPE and RDEU together yield 
Ω(μ)  = π(μ) (1 + Λ(1 − π(μ))), and sim-
ilarly for RDEU together with Bell–DA or 
Gul–DA, so that  π(μ) and  Λ (or  β ) cannot be 
separately identified.
Hence, if the data contain only binary lot-
teries, without relying strongly on  functional 
form assumptions, the best one can do is 
focus on identification and estimation of 
Ω(μ). Potential exceptions are represented 
by models that feature CPT or KR–PPE. 
Under CPT,  V(X; r) does not take the form in 
27 As we show in the online Appendix, under KR–
CPE the parameters λ and η always appear in the lottery 
 evaluation as the product Λ ≡ η(λ − 1), and therefore 
only this product can be identified.
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equation (5) because there is an exoge-
nous reference point and utility varies with 
whether outcomes are above or below that 
reference point. Hence, one can potentially 
separately identify the CPT component of 
the model by studying how behavior changes 
as outcomes move above and below the 
reference point (or, alternatively, by study-
ing how behavior changes as the reference 
point changes). Under KR–PPE, one cannot 
define a  U(X) independently of the other 
lotteries in the choice set. Hence, one can 
potentially separately identify the KR–PPE 
component of the model by studying how 
behavior changes as the choice set varies. 
Of course, one needs data with the right 
type of variation to pursue either of these 
approaches.
A frequent assumption in the literature 
is that subjective beliefs  μ coincide with 
objective expectations (e.g., “objective” 
claim probabilities), which in turn the 
econometrician can estimate. However, this 
assumption may fail in a given application. 
In that case, when  μ is assumed to equal 
objective expectations, the estimated  Ω(μ) 
function captures a mapping  Ψ from the 
estimated objective probabilities to subjec-
tive beliefs, thereby yielding another pos-
sible source of probability distortions. In 
fact, as explained before, the relationship 
between probability distortions and  μ plays 
no role in result 1, hence the same identi-
fication results hold for a model where  Ω 
is interpreted as subjective beliefs. In turn, 
this implies that under the assumption that 
households’ behavior is governed by RDEU, 
for example, the estimated  Ω(μ) function 
would not necessarily correspond to  π(μ), 
but to  (π ◦ Ψ) (μ) , and in order to identify 
the entire function  (π ◦ Ψ) ( ⋅ ) on a given 
range of values for  μ, one needs to learn 
from the data the multinomial distribution 
of deductibles chosen conditional on pre-
miums and the probability of  experiencing a 
loss for the entire range of  μ of interest.
When data contain lotteries with more 
than two outcomes, more refined inference 
is possible. For example, as pointed out in 
Barseghyan et al. (2013a), for lotteries with 
more than two outcomes, a model with 
RDEU only and a model with subjective 
beliefs only, as formalized by the mapping  Ψ, 
generate different predictions. Intuitively, 
under the mapping  Ψ alone, the weight 
on a particular event is independent of the 
magnitude of the outcome associated with 
that event. In contrast, under RDEU alone, 
the magnitude of the outcome associated 
with an event impacts the rank ordering of 
outcomes, and thereby can influence the 
weight. In addition, KR–CPE and RDEU 
may generate predictions that are different 
from those generated under either Bell–
DA or Gul–DA. Under either KR–CPE or 
RDEU, the decision weight assigned to an 
event depends only on the rank order of the 
outcome associated with that event. In con-
trast, under either model of DA, the deci-
sion weight assigned to an event depends on 
whether the outcome is above or below the 
relevant benchmark that determines disap-
pointment—i.e., the EU of the lottery under 
Bell–DA, or the certainty equivalent under 
Gul–DA. Hence, variation in outcomes that 
does not change the rank order but does 
change the magnitudes of intermediate 
outcomes can be used to distinguish these 
classes of models.
However, KR–CPE and RDEU cannot be 
separately identified even with choice data 
on lotteries with more than two outcomes. 
Indeed, one can show that, for lotteries with 
any number of outcomes, the combination of 
KR–CPE and RDEU reduces to an equiva-
lent RDEU model using effective probability 
weighting  Ω(μ)  = π(μ) (1 + Λ(1 − π(μ))) . 
Hence, it is never possible to separately 
identify KR–CPE and RDEU.28
28 Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) make a similar 
point using a decision-theoretic approach. 
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We conclude with two important and 
related implications of this discussion. 
First, for models that purport to estimate 
an RDEU model, the estimated probabil-
ity weighting functions might in fact reflect 
a combination of probability weighting and 
some other phenomenon—e.g., KR–CPE, 
Bell–DA, or Gul–DA. Second, given this 
fact, it would seem valuable to take a non-
parametric approach to estimating RDEU 
models, as opposed to restricting atten-
tion to the functional forms in table 1. As 
we summarize in section 5.2, the more 
recent literature has taken a first step in this 
direction.
5. Estimation with Individual-Level Data
In this section, we describe research 
that estimates risk preferences using 
 individual-level data. We begin by discussing 
the general approach that is broadly used in 
all of these papers. We then review how that 
approach has been applied in several differ-
ent contexts: (i) property insurance, (ii) game 
shows, and (iii) health insurance.
5.1 The General Approach
Estimating risk preferences from individ-
ual-level data typically requires three main 
steps:
Step 1: Identify a field context in which 
economic agents make choices between 
options that involve risk and for which the 
researcher can obtain data on both the 
agents’ choice sets and the agents’ choices.
Step 2: Translate the (typically) rich 
field-choice environment into a choice 
between a well-defined set of lotteries (as 
formalized in definition 1)—so that each 
model of risk preferences defined in sec-
tion 3 makes a prediction for which option 
should be chosen as a function of the taste 
parameters.
Step 3: Enrich the basic models of risk 
preferences with some form of heteroge-
neity, because in practice observationally 
equivalent agents facing identical choice sets 
are observed to make different choices.
The following subsections describe steps 2 
and 3 in some detail, along with issues that 
arise in each. It is within these steps that the 
methodological toolkits of economics need 
to be applied. Step 1 requires the researcher 
to (i) identify field contexts that are likely 
to best reveal risk preferences and (ii) be 
able to obtain the corresponding data. The 
existing work using individual-level data has 
focused on some of the field contexts tradi-
tionally emphasized by the theoretical litera-
ture (e.g., insurance), for which researchers 
have been able to obtain sufficiently rich data 
sets. As more data sets become available, and 
as economists develop a better understand-
ing of how to approach estimation of risk 
preferences, we expect the general approach 
described in this section to be applied more 
broadly.
5.1.1 Translation into Lotteries
Virtually any field-choice environment 
involves a rich context and does not present 
itself in the form of lotteries to which one 
can immediately apply a model of risk pref-
erences. Hence, to begin the analysis, one 
needs to first make a series of assumptions 
that permits translating the rich field context 
into a choice between a well-defined set of 
lotteries.
Consideration Sets.—To begin this trans-
lation, one needs to make an assumption 
about what exactly is the set of options under 
consideration—i.e., the consideration set. 
In some cases, this appears straightforward. 
For instance, in papers that study people’s 
deductible choices for property insurance, a 
natural assumption is that the consideration 
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set includes each of the possible deduct-
ibles. Even here, however, the assumption 
is less innocuous than it might seem—e.g., 
in some cases, there are available deduct-
ibles that are very rarely chosen, and so one 
might wonder whether people are actually 
even considering these possibilities, and one 
might assume these deductibles are not part 
of the choice set. Also, most analyses get 
data from one company, and thus one can-
not observe options that a household might 
have considered purchasing from another 
insurance company. We return in section 
7.4 to discuss when assumptions on the con-
sideration set are likely to be important and 
when not.
Outcomes.—A closely related assumption 
the researcher needs to make concerns the 
set of possible outcomes that might occur. In 
most field contexts, each option is associated 
with many possible outcomes. Returning to 
the example of deductible choices, during 
the policy period an individual might incur 
zero losses, one loss, two losses, three losses, 
and so forth. However, the researcher often 
restricts the set of possible outcomes. For 
example, some analyses reviewed below in 
the context of property insurance assume that 
households focus only on the possibilities of 
either zero or one loss, and they ignore the 
(small-probability event) of multiple losses 
during a single policy period. We return in 
section 7.4 to discuss when assumptions on 
the set of possible outcomes are likely to be 
important and when not.
Subjective Beliefs.—A particularly import-
ant step in the translation from the field 
context to a set of lotteries concerns what 
one assumes about agents’ subjective beliefs 
on the likelihood of the possible outcomes. 
In some field contexts, there exist clear 
 objective probabilities for outcomes—e.g., 
in games of chance such as state-run lotter-
ies or casino roulette. In most field  contexts, 
however, objective probabilities either do 
not exist or are very hard to assess. For such 
situations, an ideal approach would be to 
simultaneously estimate both the agents’ 
beliefs and preferences. As we shall see in 
section 7.3, however, this presents a funda-
mental identification problem. Hence, the 
most common approach to date has been to 
assume “rational expectations,” in the sense 
that agents’ subjective beliefs correspond to 
objective probabilities (often, but not always, 
as reflected in past or future outcomes). 
The researcher then either posits a carefully 
thought-out model of rational expectations 
formation, or posits a “reduced-form” model, 
and estimates probabilities over outcomes 
conditional on the chosen covariates based 
on realized outcomes and observed covari-
ates. These estimated probabilities are then 
typically taken as “data,” in the sense that 
they are treated as an observed input when 
estimating preferences.29
Moral Hazard.—A final important 
assumption concerns whether probabili-
ties over outcomes depend on one’s choic-
es—e.g., whether there is moral hazard in an 
insurance context. In fact, most analyses that 
estimate risk preferences assume there is no 
moral hazard, although a few directly study 
it. We discuss moral hazard more in section 
5.1.3.
5.1.2 Sources of Unobserved Heterogeneity
Given a choice set  X and beliefs  μ , each 
model of risk preferences from section 3 
generates an objective function  V(X, μ, θ) 
such that the model predicts a person will 
choose the option  X ∈ X that maximizes 
V( ⋅ ) . The vector  θ denotes a set of taste 
parameters (which differs depending on the 
model), and the goal is to estimate  θ . When 
29 In most cases, estimation error in this stage is not 
accounted for when reporting standard errors for the esti-
mates of preferences. 
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one applies these models to individual-level 
data, however, a problem inevitably arises: 
whereas each model generically predicts 
a unique optimal choice for any specific  X , 
 μ , and  θ , in virtually any data set observa-
tionally equivalent agents facing identical 
choice sets are observed to make different 
choices.30 Hence, one must enrich the basic 
models of risk preferences by allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity. There are three 
main approaches adopted in the literature 
(and some analyses incorporate two or even 
all three of them). We briefly review each of 
these approaches below, and refer the reader 
to Manski (1977) for an early discussion.
Traditionally, the most common approach 
has been to use a classical random-util-
ity model (McFadden 1974) wherein one 
assumes that agents choose the option 
X ∈ X that maximizes a “total utility” 
W(X, μ, θ)  ≡ V(X, μ, θ)  + ε(X) . Under this 
approach, the unobserved heterogeneity 
is specified at the level of utility assigned 
to option  X , and moreover, it is assumed to 
be additively separable from the underlying 
utility model reflected in  V( ⋅ ) . Hence,  ε(X) 
is an unobserved term that makes the agent 
more or less likely to choose option  X rela-
tive to what the agent’s underlying risk pref-
erence  V(X, μ, θ) would predict. One then 
specifies a joint distribution for the  ε(X) s 
for all  X ∈ X , and the random-utility model 
predicts a probability distribution over the 
set of possible options. Typically, the  ε(X) s 
are assumed to be iid with a type 1 extreme 
value distribution with scale parameter  σ ,31 
30 Indeed, in experiments it is not uncommon for indi-
vidual subjects to make different choices when presented 
the same choice situation more than once. 
31 The scale parameter  σ is a monotone transformation 
of the variance of  ε(X) , and thus a larger  σ means larger 
variance. In general, one must either normalize the scale 
of the utility function  V or the scale of the choice noise  σ . 
The literature typically uses parametrizations of  V that nor-
malize its scale, and thus  σ is typically estimated. 
in which case the predicted probability of 
choosing option  X ∗ ∈ X is
  Pr 
 
 
 
( X ∗ | θ, σ)  =  exp (V(  X ∗ , μ, θ)/σ)  ___________________  
 ∑ X∈X exp (V(X, μ, θ)/σ) . 
A second approach is to use a random-prefer-
ence model wherein one assumes unobserved 
heterogeneity in the vector  θ of preference 
parameters (recall that we discussed identifi-
cation of such models in section 4.3). Under 
this approach, one maintains that agents 
choose the option  X ∈ X that maximizes 
V(X, μ, θ) . However, one further assumes 
that there is unobserved (to the researcher) 
heterogeneity in  θ , and thus the researcher 
will observe different choices even among 
observationally equivalent agents facing 
identical choice sets. Of course, rather than 
estimate a specific  θ , the goal becomes to 
estimate a distribution  F(θ) , which might be 
done parametrically or nonparametrically. In 
particular, if  Θ(  X ∗ ) is the set of  θ such that 
X ∗ is the optimal choice, the predicted prob-
ability of choosing option  X ∗ ∈ X is
  Pr 
 
 
 
(  X ∗ | F)  =  ∫ θ∈Θ( X ∗ )   dF(θ) . 
Finally, one can assume unobserved het-
erogeneity in beliefs. Here, one again main-
tains that agents choose the option  X ∈ X 
that maximizes  V(X, μ, θ) . However, one 
relaxes the assumption that subjective beliefs 
μ are “data,” and instead assumes that there 
is unobserved (to the researcher) hetero-
geneity in beliefs. One then specifies a dis-
tribution for  μ —typically with mean equal 
to objective probabilities—and the model 
predicts a probability distribution over the 
set of possible outcomes. In particular, if 
 μ(  X ∗ ) is the set of  μ such that  X ∗ is the opti-
mal choice, and if  G(μ) is the distribution of 
μ , then the predicted probability of choosing 
X ∗ ∈ X is
 Pr 
 
 
 
(  X ∗ |θ, G)  =  ∫ μ∈μ( X ∗ )   dG(μ) . 
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Once one enriches the model by incor-
porating one or more of these unobserved 
heterogeneity terms, one then estimates the 
parameters—both the preference param-
eters and the unobserved heterogeneity 
parameters—by making the predicted dis-
tribution of choices “match” the empirically 
observed distribution of choices (using max-
imum likelihood (ML), Markov chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC), or some other econometric 
technique).
Each of these approaches has advantages 
and limitations. Incorporating unobserved 
heterogeneity at the level of preference 
parameters or beliefs can be appealing 
because it maintains that choices are driven 
entirely by the underlying utility model 
reflected in  V( ⋅ ) . However, such models can 
run into trouble when the choice set includes 
dominated options—i.e., options that should 
not be chosen for any values of  θ or  μ . If in 
the data a dominated option is chosen with 
positive probability (something that often 
happens in practice), the researcher must 
either introduce some form of random trem-
bles in choice or dismiss the subpopulation 
that chooses dominated options. For exam-
ple, Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum 
(2016), which we discuss in section 5.2, use a 
random-preference model where the curva-
ture of the utility function is constrained to lie 
in a conservative range, and document that 
the model is incompatible with the choice of 
a dominated option made by 13 percent of 
households in their data. In contrast, a ran-
dom-utility model predicts that all options 
in the choice set, even dominated options, 
should be made with positive probability.
On the other hand, by imposing noise at 
the utility level in an additively separable 
way, random-utility models run into a dif-
ferent problem. In many underlying utility 
models, the preference parameters influ-
ence not only the nature of preferences, but 
also the utility differences between different 
outcomes. As a simple example, under EU 
with a CRRA utility function, an increase in 
ρ on the one hand makes a person more risk 
averse, but also decreases the utility differ-
ences between any two outcomes. Because, 
given additive separability, the unobserved 
heterogeneity term operates on the utility 
differences, this can generate some perverse 
features. Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) 
point out one particular implication of this 
issue: For any fixed  σ , the choice probabili-
ties can be nonmonotonic in the preference 
parameters. For instance, under EU with 
CRRA (or CARA), increasing  ρ (or  r ) might 
initially shift choice probabilities more and 
more toward favoring a safer lottery, but as 
ρ (or  r ) gets larger yet the utility differences 
shrink, and so choice probabilities shift more 
and more toward choosing at random (and 
away from favoring the safer lottery).
Of course, when one estimates a ran-
dom-utility model, one jointly estimates the 
preference parameters in  θ and the extent of 
unobserved heterogeneity as reflected by  σ , 
and part of the estimation will involve setting 
the magnitude of  σ to be appropriate relative 
to the level of utility differences given the 
estimated  θ . For instance, under EU with 
CRRA utility, when observed choices call for 
the estimate of  ρ to be larger, the estimate 
of  σ will just need to be smaller. Hence, this 
issue seems unlikely to be a major problem 
when estimating a model of homogeneous 
preferences. However, it becomes more 
worrisome when estimating a model with 
(observed or unobserved) heterogeneity 
in risk preferences, because typically  σ is 
fixed across individuals and therefore indi-
viduals with different risk preferences are 
differently impacted by the noise term in a 
systematic way. Under EU with CRRA util-
ity, for instance, those with higher  ρ will be 
more influenced by the noise term (i.e., their 
choice probabilities will be more random).
We conclude with two final comments 
about the three approaches above. First, 
in principle, the unobserved  heterogeneity 
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could reflect either permanent differences 
across economic agents or random differ-
ences within agents across choice situations. 
In cross-sectional data, one could never 
distinguish one from the other, but if one 
observes multiple choices from each agent, 
one can start to tease these apart. In sec-
tion 7.1, we discuss in detail the extent to 
which economic agents exhibit stable risk 
preferences versus risk preferences that 
change from context to context. Second, 
returning again to the comparison with the 
experimental setting, we note that while the 
latter permits great control over the issues 
raised in step 2, experimental analyses also 
must deal with observationally equivalent 
subjects facing identical choice sets who 
make different choices. Hence, experi-
mental analyses also must think through 
different ways of introducing unobserved 
heterogeneity.
5.1.3 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Much of the literature estimating risk pref-
erences using individual-level data focuses 
on the insurance context. In this context, 
economists have long discussed the prob-
lems of moral hazard and adverse selection, 
and thus we comment on these issues here.32
In the context of insurance, moral haz-
ard refers to the idea that individuals who 
have more insurance coverage will have less 
incentive to take care, and thus are more 
likely to incur a loss—in other words, peo-
ple’s risk is endogenous to their choices. 
Such endogenous risk—which in principle 
could arise in other environments as well—
can create problems in two ways for estima-
tion of risk preferences. First, because it is 
hard to account for it, many analyses assume 
that it does not exist. For such analyses, if in 
32 There is a large literature in economics that tests 
for the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in 
insurance markets. We briefly summarize the empirical 
findings of that literature in the online appendix. 
fact moral hazard does exist, then estimates 
of risk preferences might be biased. Second, 
if moral hazard exists, then there must be a 
reason why behavior is changing—e.g., in 
the insurance context, the fact that people 
take less care when they have more coverage 
presumably reflects that they get some form 
of utility from taking less care. If so, then this 
feature of preferences should be incorpo-
rated into the analysis.
Adverse selection refers to the idea that 
individuals who bear more risk (which is not 
observable or cannot be priced) are more 
likely to purchase higher insurance coverage. 
Adverse selection clearly is a problem for the 
insurance company. However, it is less of a 
concern for a researcher trying to estimate 
risk preferences as long as unobserved het-
erogeneity in risk can be taken into account, 
even if this unobserved heterogeneity is cor-
related with unobserved heterogeneity in 
risk preferences.33
We conclude with raising one more issue 
closely related to unobserved heterogeneity. 
If there is unobserved heterogeneity in risk 
preferences, then the researcher needs to be 
confident that the choice sets faced by the 
agents are independent of those risk pref-
erences. In particular, risk preferences are 
estimated by investigating how agents react 
to changes in choice sets, and thus our esti-
mates would be biased if a change in choice 
sets were correlated with a change in risk 
preferences. In the insurance context, for 
instance, if an insurance company can easily 
get a sense of a person’s risk preferences, the 
company might be able to increase profits by 
adjusting the insurance pricing in reaction to 
those preferences. In practice, most insur-
ance pricing is not done in this way—often 
due to heavy regulation—and thus this issue 
is perhaps less of a problem.
33 For a leading example, see Cohen and Einav (2007), 
which is discussed in detail in section 5.2. 
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5.2 Property-Insurance Data
Insurance choices are a natural domain 
in which to estimate risk preferences. Due 
to difficulties in obtaining data prior to the 
2000s, there are relatively few papers that 
use individual-level insurance data to carry 
out this task.
The first paper to use individual-level 
data on insurance choices to estimate risk 
preferences is Cicchetti and Dubin (1994). 
They analyze data from Mountain Bell on 
roughly 10,000 residential telephone cus-
tomers in Colorado in 1990. The choice of 
interest is whether customers purchased 
inside-wire insurance. This insurance cost 
roughly $0.45 per month, and protected 
against telephone-wire problems inside 
one’s residence. Without the insurance, 
in the event of a problem, the household 
would need to pay the service cost to fix 
the problem, which averaged about $55. 
The probability of experiencing a problem 
was roughly  0.5 percent (see below), and 
thus the expected benefit of the insurance 
was roughly $0.275. Hence, purchasing this 
insurance for $0.45 is a clear sign of aversion 
to risk. Cicchetti and Dubin set out to get a 
more precise understanding of this aversion 
to risk.
In order to translate the field context 
into the domain of preferences (a choice 
between lotteries, as discussed in section 
5.1), Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) assume 
that households effectively choose between 
the following two lotteries:
 (−p, 1) versus (−L, μ; 0, 1 − μ) .
The first lottery is that associated with the 
choice to purchase the insurance, where  p 
is the premium charged for the insurance. 
The second lottery is that associated with the 
choice not to insure, where  μ is the proba-
bility of experiencing a problem within any 
given month, and  L is the expected  service 
cost in the event of a problem.34 The authors 
estimate  μ using data on historical (1982–
86) trouble calls, where they divide the data 
into nine zones, and they take the observed 
ratio of trouble calls to customers in each 
zone to be the probability of a problem 
for customers in that zone. Then, in their 
empirical analysis, they treat  p ,  L , and  μ as 
data.
Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) estimate an 
EU model with a HARA utility specification. 
For prior wealth—a required input in the 
HARA specification—they use a measure 
of monthly income generated from census 
data. They also allow the curvature of the 
utility function to depend on a household’s 
average monthly bill.35 In addition to esti-
mating an EU model, they also estimate an 
RDEU model with a parametrized form of 
overweighting of probabilities—the one in 
Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992).
They estimate these models by ML, 
where they use a McFadden (1974) 
 random-utility specification to account 
for observationally equivalent households 
making heterogeneous choices. From their 
estimates, Cicchetti and Dubin  (1994) con-
clude that “the overall pattern of results is 
remarkably consistent with expected util-
ity theory” (p. 183). In particular, they find 
virtually no evidence of overweighting of 
probabilities—i.e., RDEU does no better 
than EU—and they argue that 78 percent 
of households have an estimated utility 
function consistent with EU. Finally, they 
note that, for the average household, the 
estimated degree of absolute risk aversion 
34 This formulation implicitly assumes that households 
expect, at most, one problem in any given month. As we 
mentioned in section 5.1, this type of assumption is com-
mon in the literature. 
35 They motivate this assumption based on a reduced-
form finding that households with larger average monthly 
bills are more likely to purchase inside-wire insurance. 
While this assumption will capture that feature in their 
structural estimation of risk preferences, it is not clear that 
there is a good primitive justification for it. 
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is relatively small and yields a willingness to 
pay for the insurance virtually identical to 
the expected benefit from the insurance.
The Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) paper 
has a number of limitations. Perhaps most 
important is a data limitation: their data 
contain very little variation in  p ,  L , and  μ .36 
Hence, their estimation primarily identifies 
the impact of monthly income and average 
monthly bill on the (local) degree of abso-
lute risk aversion. Moreover, as we discussed 
in section 4, the limited variation in  p ,  L , 
and  μ creates a major impediment to sepa-
rately identifying both utility curvature and 
probability weighting, and thus their RDEU 
estimates depend heavily on their function-
al-form assumptions for utility and prob-
ability weighting. As such, one should be 
cautious in interpreting their estimates for 
the degree of probability overweighting.
Finally, upon closer look, it is not so clear 
how EU in fact fares. For the 22 percent of 
households with an estimated utility function 
inconsistent with EU, the inconsistency is in 
the form of a decreasing utility function (i.e., 
less is better), which is clearly counterfactual. 
Among the 78 percent of households with 
an estimated utility function consistent with 
EU, nearly half of them (37 percent of all 
households) are estimated to be risk loving. 
Moreover, in addition to permitting choices 
to depend on risk preferences, Cicchetti and 
Dubin (1994) also include a direct prefer-
ence for insurance meant to reflect “shifts in 
tastes and preferences that may be attribut-
able to the insured versus uninsured states” 
(perhaps due to a belief that households with 
insurance will get priority service relative to 
households without insurance). In the esti-
mated model, this direct preference is esti-
mated to be quite large and appears to be the 
36 The paper seems to suggest that, in the estimation, 
a single value of  p and  L is used for all households. While 
there is some variation in  μ across the nine zones, its range 
of  [0.32 percent, 0.74 percent] is very tight. 
main factor explaining the choice to purchase 
insurance for many households.37 Despite 
these limitations, the Cicchetti and Dubin 
paper was the first of its kind in the domain 
of insurance, and inspired later papers that 
were able to work with better data and more 
sophisticated models.
A key contribution in this direction is 
made by Cohen and Einav (2007), which 
provides a much more sophisticated anal-
ysis, although the authors limit themselves 
to the EU framework. They use individ-
ual-level data from an insurance provider 
in Israel, and analyze deductible choices 
among households who purchased one par-
ticular form of auto insurance (similar to 
comprehensive automobile insurance in the 
United States). In their data, all households 
have purchased the insurance, and the deci-
sion of interest is which of four deductible 
options they chose. The data contain the full 
menu of premium–deductible combinations 
offered to each household, along with that 
household’s chosen deductible. In addition, 
they observe actual claims made by these 
households during the policy year.
Since virtually all households (98.9 per-
cent) chose one of the two lowest deductibles, 
Cohen and Einav (2007) limit attention to 
the choice between those two.38 Hence, they 
translate the field context into the domain 
of preferences—i.e., a choice between lot-
teries—by assuming that households were 
37 Relative to the Rabin (2000) critique, this direct pref-
erence for insurance term is how they were able to explain 
the purchase of insurance even at reasonable levels of risk 
aversion. Yet, there has been some controversy on whether 
the fact itself that individuals purchase insurance for such 
small risk at a price that is twice the expected loss can be 
considered consistent with EU theory, especially in light of 
the relatively small estimates of absolute risk aversion; see, 
e.g., Camerer (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), and Fehr-
Duda and Epper (2012). 
38 Cohen and Einav (2007) do not drop households that 
chose one of the two high deductibles, but rather they pro-
ceed as if those households had chosen the highest remain-
ing deductible. 
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effectively choosing between the following 
two lotteries:
  (− p l −  d l , μ; − p l , 1 − μ)
versus
 (− p h −  d h , μ;  − p h , 1 − μ) . 
The first lottery is that associated with the 
choice of the lower deductible, and the sec-
ond lottery is that associated with the choice 
of the higher deductible. For each choice 
k ∈ { l, h} ,  p k is the premium charged for the 
insurance,  d k is the deductible that must be 
paid by the household in the event of a loss, 
and  μ is the probability of experiencing a loss 
during the policy period. The insurance is 
typically priced such that lower deductibles 
are actuarially unfair—i.e., a risk-neutral 
household would choose the higher deduct-
ible  d h , and  d l would be optimal if the house-
hold is risk averse enough.39
This formulation reflects three simplify-
ing assumptions. First, it assumes that each 
household’s deductible choice does not 
influence its claim probability  μ —i.e., it 
assumes that there is no moral hazard with 
respect to the deductible choice. Second, 
it assumes that every possible loss is larger 
than the larger deductible  d h . Cohen and 
Einav (2007) explicitly discuss these assump-
tions, and argue that they are supported in 
their data. The third simplifying assumption 
is that households make decisions while con-
sidering a policy period that is infinitesimally 
small, thereby implicitly yielding that house-
holds ignore the possibility of incurring more 
than one claim during the policy period. But 
since multiple claims are rare (in their data, 
only 2.70 percent of households experience 
more than one claim over the one-year pol-
icy period), this assumption is probably not 
39 Under their benchmark estimates of claim rates, this 
is true for 98.7 percent of households (p. 752). 
restrictive (as we discussed in section 5.1, 
similar assumptions are made in subsequent 
analyses).40
Cohen and Einav (2007) then estimate an 
EU model with an NTD specification for the 
utility function.41 Importantly, they permit 
both observed heterogeneity (i.e., depen-
dence on household observables) and unob-
served heterogeneity in both the degree of 
(absolute) risk aversion  r and the likelihood 
of a claim  μ . Indeed, the main goal of their 
analysis is to assess (i) the extent of such het-
erogeneity, (ii) the relative importance of 
heterogeneity in risk versus in risk prefer-
ences, and (iii) the correlation between the 
unobserved elements of the heterogeneity. 
Formally, they assume that claims are gener-
ated by a Poisson process with Poisson claim 
rate  λ , and that  r and  λ have a bivariate log-
normal distribution with
 ( ln  λ i  ln  r i  )  ∼ iid N ( [  x i ′  β λ   x i ′  β r ] ,  [  σ λ 
2
 
ρ  σ λ  σ r   ρ  σ λ  σ r   σ r 2 ] ) . 
In the above expression,  σ λ 2 is the variance 
of  λ,  σ r 2 is the variance of  r, and  ρ is their 
correlation.
Cohen and Einav (2007) estimate this 
model using an MCMC approach. The data 
contain several key features that permit them 
to parametrically identify the unobserved 
heterogeneity in risk preferences and in 
risk. First, they observe the full distribution 
of (the number of) household claims over 
the course of the one-year policy period. 
This distribution permits them to directly 
40 Although Cohen and Einav’s (2007) approach effec-
tively assumes that households ignore the possibility of 
multiple claims during the policy period, their estimation 
still uses the full distribution of number of claims over the 
policy period, because this distribution is needed to iden-
tify the variance and correlations of unobserved heteroge-
neity in risk (as we discuss below). 
41 In fact, their utility equation is slightly different from 
the one in section 3 because they consider a policy period 
that is infinitesimally small. 
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estimate the mean and variance of risk 
(for a fixed set of observables) without any 
 reference to premium–deductible menus or 
to choices.42 Second, different households 
in the data are offered different menus of 
 (  p l ,  d l ) versus  (  p h ,  d h ) .43 Seeing how 
 households respond to different menus 
(while knowing the mean and variance of 
risk) permits identification of the mean and 
variance of risk aversion. Finally, seeing 
how these responses differ between house-
holds with different claims experiences (i.e., 
households with a different number of actual 
claims experienced during the one-year 
policy period) permits identification of the 
correlation between the unobserved compo-
nents of risk and risk preferences.
Cohen and Einav’s (2007) estimation yields 
several interesting conclusions. First, in terms 
of the degree of risk aversion, mean risk 
aversion is quite large ( r = 0.0019 ), but in 
fact the distribution is quite skewed and the 
median is more reasonable ( r = 0.0000073 ). 
In other words, in the estimated model, the 
roughly 18 percent of households that choose 
the low deductible are primarily explained 
by very high risk aversion. Second, they find 
more unobserved heterogeneity in risk aver-
sion than in risk, and moreover, given their 
estimates, the unobserved heterogeneity in 
risk preferences is more important for profits 
and pricing. Finally, they find a strong posi-
tive correlation between unobserved hetero-
geneity in risk preferences and unobserved 
 heterogeneity in risk. This is driven by the 
fact that as the observed number of claims 
42 Note that if they only observed whether or not house-
holds made any claims, they could only estimate the mean 
claim rate. The variance of claim rates is identified by com-
paring the likelihood of at least one claim to the likelihoods 
of at least two or more claims. 
43 This variation is not purely idiosyncratic. For 
instance, for two-thirds of households, the menu satisfies 
 d h = 0.5  p h ,  d l = 0.3  p h , and  p l = 1.06  p h , where the varia-
tion across households comes entirely from variation in  p h . 
But there is some additional variation, which Cohen and 
Einav (2007) discuss in some detail. 
increases, the proportion of households that 
choose the low deductible increases rap-
idly. They are cautious in concluding too 
much from this positive correlation, because 
the unobservables that drive a correlation 
between risk aversion and risk might be very 
context specific.
Sydnor (2010) uses similar data to also 
study the implications of EU for insurance 
deductible choices. However, he does not 
pursue an estimation of preferences, but 
rather a calibration approach in the spirit 
of Rabin (2000). Nonetheless, this paper 
is instructive for those who want to esti-
mate risk preferences using insurance data. 
Sydnor uses individual-level data from a 
large home insurance company, from which 
he obtained a random sample of 50,000 
home insurance policyholders in a sin-
gle state in a single year. At this company, 
each policyholder must choose one of four 
deductibles—$1,000, $500, $250, or $100—
where a lower deductible implies a higher 
premium. Much like Cohen and Einav 
(2007), Sydnor observes the full menu of 
premium–deductible combinations offered 
to each household, along with that house-
hold’s chosen deductible. In addition, he 
observes actual claims made by these house-
holds during the policy year, from which he 
can derive claim rates.
Sydnor (2010) translates this field context 
into the domain of preferences exactly as in 
Cohen and Einav (2007), by assuming that 
households are effectively choosing between 
four lotteries of the form 
  (− p d − d, μ;  − p d , 1 − μ) , 
where  p d is the premium charged for the 
insurance,  d is the deductible that must be 
paid by the household in the event of a loss, 
and  μ is the probability of experiencing a loss 
during the policy period. This formulation 
reflects three simplifying assumptions simi-
lar to those in Cohen and Einav (2007).
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In his main analysis, Sydnor (2010) consid-
ers an EU model with CRRA utility, and he 
calibrates the degree of relative risk aversion 
( ρ ) that households would need to have to 
explain their choices. More precisely, for the 
6,268 customers who were new at the sam-
ple firm in the sample year—and who thus 
were more likely to have actively chosen 
their deductible—he focuses on the 3,791 
customers who chose either the $500 or the 
$250 deductible.44 Choosing a deductible 
smaller than the maximum ($1,000) reveals 
an aversion to risk, and Sydnor calibrates for 
each household a lower bound on how risk 
averse that household must be. In his base-
line calibration, he assigns to each household 
a claim rate equal to the average claim rate 
among those who chose that deductible, 
and he assumes a prior wealth of $1 million. 
He demonstrates that, for the vast major-
ity of the households that chose deduct-
ibles smaller than $1,000, this specification 
implies implausibly large risk aversion. He 
further demonstrates that this finding is 
robust to assuming a variety of values for 
prior wealth and to assigning to each house-
hold a fitted claim rate (in much the same 
way as described below for Barseghyan et al. 
2013b). Based on these calibrations, Sydnor 
concludes that EU is not a good explanation 
of people’s deductible choices, and he then 
discusses several potential alternative expla-
nations, including risk misperceptions, prob-
ability weighting, and KR loss aversion.
Barseghyan et al. (2013b), BMOT hence-
forth, use similar data to estimate a probabil-
ity distortion model (as described in section 
4.4). In other words, they consider a model 
that, in the insurance-deductible context, 
nests EU, RDEU, KR loss aversion, Bell 
or Gul disappointment aversion, and risk 
misperceptions, and they investigate which 
combination best explains the  variation in 
44 Because only 3 of the 6,268 new customers chose the 
$100 deductible, he does not analyze that group. 
the data.45 Their data come from a large 
insurance company that sells multiple lines 
of coverage. The full data set comprises 
yearly information on more than 400,000 
households who held auto or home policies 
between 1998 and 2006. For their main 
analysis, BMOT use a core data set of 4,170 
households who were new customers at the 
firm in 2005 or 2006 and who purchased 
both home and auto insurance. The authors 
focus on households’ initial choices. In this 
group, every household made a deductible 
choice for three coverages: home all-perils 
insurance, auto collision insurance, and auto 
comprehensive insurance. For each choice, 
the data contain the full menu of premium–
deductible combinations offered to each 
household, along with that household’s cho-
sen deductible.46 In addition, the data con-
tain the history of claims for all households.
The translation of the field domain into the 
domain of lotteries is exactly as in Cohen and 
Einav (2007) and Sydnor (2010), except that 
BMOT make one further assumption: they 
assume that households bracket the three 
choices narrowly in the sense that, while each 
household has fixed risk preferences that apply 
to all three choices, the household treats these 
choices as three independent decisions of the 
form studied by Cohen and Einav (2007) and 
Sydnor (2010). It is worth highlighting that 
45 As discussed in section 4, BMOT can only identify 
an overall probability distortion, and cannot break it down 
into these possible underlying forces. Nonetheless, this 
approach identifies the extent to which these underly-
ing forces together might help better explain deductible 
choices (relative to EU). 
46 The available deductible options were the same for 
all households. For home, the options were $100, $250, 
$500, $1,000, $2,500, and $5,000; for collision, the options 
were $100, $200, $250, $500, and $1,000; and for compre-
hensive, the options were $50, $100, $200, $250, $500, and 
$1,000. In order to make it plausible that every potential 
claim is larger than the largest deductible, BMOT exclude 
the two highest deductibles in home (chosen by only 
1.6 percent of households); households that chose such 
deductibles are kept in the analysis and treated as if they 
chose a $1,000 deductible (this approach is analogous to 
that in Cohen and Einav 2007). 
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the assumption of narrow bracketing is in 
fact implicit in Cohen and Einav (2007) and 
Sydnor (2010), in the sense that they assume 
that people have risk preferences that apply to 
their single observed deductible choice with-
out reference to all the other risk choices that 
households are making.47
BMOT estimate a probability distortion 
model. Applied to the context of choos-
ing deductibles, the utility from choosing 
deductible  d is
 Ω(μ) u(w −  p d − d)  +  (1 − Ω(μ)) u(w −  p d ), 
where  μ is the (objective) probability of 
a claim,  u is a utility function, and  Ω is a 
 probability distortion function. As a prelim-
inary step, BMOT use the full sample and 
the full history of claims to estimate, for each 
coverage, a Poisson panel regression with 
random effects. They then use the output 
from these claim rate regressions to assign to 
each household a fitted probability of a claim 
for each coverage. In the estimation of pref-
erences, these claim probabilities are treated 
as data.48
In their benchmark analysis, BMOT esti-
mate a model of homogeneous preferences, 
i.e., where all households have the same util-
ity function  u and the same probability dis-
tortion function  Ω . They assume an NTD 
specification for  u (see table 1; the analysis 
is then repeated for CARA and CRRA  utility 
47 In their benchmark estimation, the only advantage 
(relative to Cohen and Einav 2007) of having three choices 
per household is that it yields increased variation in claim 
probabilities and prices represented in the data. When 
BMOT incorporate observed and unobserved heterogene-
ity into the analysis, this feature will then add a restriction 
that each household must have the same risk preferences 
across all three coverages. 
48 They demonstrate that the main results are robust 
to instead assigning to each household a fitted distribu-
tion of claim probabilities for each coverage. As such, the 
approach in BMOT is roughly equivalent to that in Cohen 
and Einav (2007), except that they do not permit the 
unobserved heterogeneity in risk to be correlated with the 
unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences. 
functions), but they take a  nonparametric 
approach to  Ω . Specifically, they consider 
three nonparametric approaches: (i) a poly-
nomial expansion of  ln Ω(μ) , (ii) a polynomial 
expansion of  Ω(μ) , and (iii) a cubic spline. All 
three approaches yield the same conclusion: 
large probability distortions characterized by 
substantial overweighting of claim probabili-
ties and only mild insensitivity to probability 
changes. Moreover, while there also is sta-
tistically significant curvature in  u , econom-
ically the lion’s share of households’ observed 
aversion to risk is attributed to probability 
distortions. This result represents a more con-
vincing demonstration than Sydnor (2010) of 
the limitations of EU in explaining deduct-
ible choices. Whereas Sydnor (2010) merely 
provides calibration arguments against EU 
based on the required curvature of the utility 
function being “too large,” BMOT find that 
a model with large probability distortions 
better explains the data without imposing 
any restrictions on the magnitude of curva-
ture in the utility function. BMOT compare 
special cases of models yielding probability 
distortions, including KR loss aversion and 
Gul disappointment aversion (see section 
3.4 for details on these models), with the 
nonparametric estimate of  Ω(μ) , to assess 
whether these models are consistent with 
the empirical evidence. The results show that 
neither KR loss aversion alone nor Gul dis-
appointment aversion alone can explain the 
estimated probability distortions, thereby 
suggesting a key role for probability weight-
ing in individuals’ deductible choices.
BMOT next expand their analysis to 
incorporate both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity in both the curvature of the 
utility function and in the magnitude of the 
probability distortions. When allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity, BMOT’s econo-
metric model takes the form of a mixed 
logit (with parametric assumptions on the 
 distribution of the unobserved heterogene-
ity terms), which they estimate via MCMC. 
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The mean  estimated probability distortions 
in a model that allows for observed hetero-
geneity only, unobserved heterogeneity only, 
or both, are nearly identical to each other 
and to the estimated probability distortions 
in a model with homogeneous preferences. 
Hence, whether BMOT assume preferences 
are homogeneous or allow for observed or 
unobserved heterogeneity, their main mes-
sage is the same. By contrast, the estimated 
degree of standard risk aversion is somewhat 
sensitive to the modeling approach. The vari-
ance estimates for the unobserved heteroge-
neity terms suggest a substantial presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity (though smaller 
than in Cohen and Einav 2007); unob-
served heterogeneity in  r and in probability 
distortions are estimated to be negatively 
correlated.
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum 
(2016) use the same data and focus on the 
same probability distortion model, where 
they assume CARA utility. However, they 
allow for completely unrestricted heteroge-
neity in  r and  Ω . Specifically, they assume 
that each household has its own preferences 
(  r i ,  Ω i ( ⋅ )) , and they make the key identify-
ing assumption that these preferences do not 
change as the household makes risky choices 
across the three distinct but closely related 
property insurance contexts (we return to 
a discussion of this stability assumption in 
section 7.1). With this assumption, they can 
partially identify (provide bounds for) each 
household’s risk preferences.
In the probability distortion model, a 
household’s deductible choice in coverage  j 
implies a lower and an upper bound on its 
probability distortion as a function of  r i and μ j :
(6)  L B i (  r i ,  μ j ) ≤  Ω i (  μ j ) ≤ U B i (  r i ,  μ j ). 
Because the authors observe three choices 
per household, typically with different  μ j , 
they obtain three pairs of bounds—or 
 intervals—per household. Much as discussed 
in section 5.1.2, however, some households 
make choices that cannot be rationalized 
by any  (  r i ,  Ω i (  μ j )) , and thus the authors 
exclude 13 percent of the households from 
the analysis.49
Without further assumptions, the restric-
tions in equation (6) are all that can be learned 
from the data and the model. However, the 
various models reviewed in section 4.4 that 
lead to probability distortions (with the 
exception of  Ω i ( ⋅ ) representing subjective 
beliefs) yield that the function  Ω i ( ⋅ ) is mono-
tone in  μ. The authors therefore focus on 
exploring the identifying power of this shape 
restriction to tighten the bounds, and then 
explore four additional shape restrictions: 
quadraticity, linearity, unit slope, and zero 
intercept.50 Under each restriction, for each 
household, the authors search for the mini-
mal  r i such that the household’s intervals sat-
isfy the shape restriction. They then analyze 
that household’s lower and upper bounds 
in equation (6) given that minimal  r i . Of 
course, for each successive restriction, more 
households are excluded because there is no 
 (  r i ,  Ω i (  μ j )) that can rationalize their choices 
while satisfying that shape restriction.
The authors first analyze the distribution of 
the minimal  r i s under each shape restriction. 
They find that this distribution is skewed to 
the right in each case, and that the median 
is zero under each nondegenerate shape 
restriction (i.e., each shape restriction other 
than zero intercept). Indeed, they find that 
the vast majority of households—between 
70 and 80 percent—can be rationalized by 
49 In fact, while some of these households could be 
rationalized with a very large  r i , the authors also choose to 
exclude households that cannot be rationalized with an  r i 
that lies in a reasonable range. Specifically, for reasons they 
explain in section 5 of their paper, they require  r i < 0.0108 . 
50 The shape restrictions are cumulative. That is, qua-
draticity requires that  Ω( ⋅ ) is both monotone and qua-
dratic, i.e.,  Ω(μ)  = a + bμ + c μ 2 ,  b ≥ 0 , and  c ≥ − b / 2 ; 
linearity requires  Ω(μ)  = a + bμ ,  b ≥ 0 ; unit slope requires 
Ω(μ)  = a + μ ; and zero intercept requires  Ω(μ)  = μ . 
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a model with linear utility given monotone, 
quadratic, or even linear probability distor-
tions. By contrast, they find that fewer than 
40 percent can be rationalized by a model 
with concave utility but no probability distor-
tions. Next, they use the intervals to perform 
kernel regressions of the lower and upper 
bounds on  Ω(μ) as a function of  μ (under each 
restriction including only households that 
can be rationalized under that restriction). 
Under each nondegenerate shape restric-
tion, the results evince a distortion function 
that substantially overweights small proba-
bilities. Under monotonicity, for instance, 
the midpoints of the estimated bounds 
imply  Ω(0.02) = 0.11 ,  Ω(0.05) = 0.17 , 
and  Ω(0.10) = 0.25 , and even the esti-
mated lower bounds imply  Ω(0.02) = 0.07 , 
 Ω(0.05) = 0.12 , and  Ω(0.10) = 0.15 . 
The results are very similar under qua-
draticity and linearity. Moreover, these 
results are largely consistent with the 
results in BMOT, which were obtained 
under more stringent functional form 
assumptions.
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum 
(2016) further show how one can utilize the 
intervals to obtain a point estimate  Ω( ⋅ ) for 
the representative household without relying 
on parametric assumptions about the nature 
of unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, 
they build an estimator based on finding the 
Ω( ⋅ ) that comes closest to rationalizing the 
behavior of households with monotone  Ω( ⋅ ) . 
The estimated  Ω( ⋅ ) can rationalize all three 
choices of nearly one in five households 
whose behavior is consistent with monotone 
probability distortions. Moreover, the residual 
deviation between the households’ intervals 
and the estimated  Ω( ⋅ ) allows one to uncover 
the lower bound on the degree of heteroge-
neity in probability distortions among house-
holds. An interesting next step for future 
research is to generalize this approach to 
broader models of decision making under 
uncertainty.
5.3 Game Shows
Several papers estimate risk preferences 
using data from television game shows. 
Game shows provide an attractive setting 
for estimating EU and non-EU models. 
Contestants “are presented with well-de-
fined choices where the stakes are real and 
sizable, and the tasks are repeated in the 
same manner from contestant to contestant” 
(Andersen et al. 2008, p. 361). Field settings 
rarely have such desirable characteristics. 
That said, a game show is conducted in a 
peculiar environment that raises concerns 
about ecological and external validity and 
observer and selection bias. For this reason, 
we provide only a brief discussion of the pio-
neers of the literature and references to a 
selection of other studies.
The pioneers of the game-show literature 
include Gertner (1993), who uses data from 
Card Sharks, Metrick (1995), who uses data 
from Jeopardy!, and Beetsma and Schotman 
(2001), who use data from the Dutch show 
Lingo.
Gertner (1993) assumes that Card Sharks 
contestants are EU maximizers with CARA 
utility and pursues two methods for esti-
mating the lower bound on the coeffi-
cients of absolute risk aversion,  r . First, 
Gertner looks solely at the contestants’ bets 
in the final round of the game and obtains 
a lower bound on each contestant’s  r by 
assuming that a contestant who wagers her 
entire stake is risk neutral and a contestant 
who wagers the minimum amount (half 
of her stake) wishes to bet exactly that. He 
reports an average lower bound of  0.000310 . 
Second, Gertner looks at the contestants’ 
bets in all rounds and compares the sample 
distribution of outcomes with the distribu-
tion of outcomes if a contestant plays the 
optimal strategy for a risk-neutral contes-
tant. By revealed preference, an “average” 
contestant prefers the former distribution to 
the latter, and so the degree of absolute risk 
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aversion that would make a contestant indif-
ferent between the two distributions pro-
vides an estimate of the average lower bound 
on  r . Under this method, Gertner reports an 
average lower bound of  0.0000711 .51
Metrick (1995) also models Jeopardy! 
contestants as EU maximizers with CARA 
utility. In the pertinent part of the paper, 
Metrick looks only at the bets of the leaders 
in the final round of “runaway” games, i.e., 
games in which the leader is so far ahead 
entering the final round that she can guar-
antee a win by betting a sufficiently small 
amount. From the first-order necessary 
condition of the leader’s utility maximiza-
tion problem, Metrick derives an expres-
sion for the leader’s subjective probability 
of answering correctly given her bet and 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion  r . This 
expression is exactly the form of a logit 
regression. He then obtains an ML estimate 
of  r for the “representative” contestant (i.e., 
he obtains the  r that maximizes the likeli-
hood of the observed sample of bets and 
correct/incorrect answers). He reports a 
statistically insignificant point estimate of 
 0.000066 .52
Beetsma and Schotman (2001) consider 
EU maximization with both CRRA and 
CARA utility functions. They analyze the 
decision at the start of a round in the Lingo 
51 In the second part of the paper, Gertner (1993) pres-
ents evidence that contestants’ bets are inconsistent with 
EU maximization. More specifically, he finds that contes-
tants’ bets exhibit sensitivity to accumulated winnings in 
the current round (stakes), but not to accumulated win-
nings in previous rounds (wealth). 
52 In another part of the paper, Metrick (1995) looks at 
the bets of the first- and second-place contestants entering 
the final round of games in which these contestants can 
mostly ignore the actions of the third contestant. In this 
part, however, Metrick does not focus on estimating the 
contestants’ risk preferences. Rather, he focuses on testing 
whether the contestants play “empirical-best-responses,” 
i.e., best-responses to the empirical frequency of strategies 
played by their opponents in his sample of similar games. 
He finds that while first-place contestants generally play 
empirical-best-responses, second-place contestants do not. 
finals to stop or continue play of the game. 
They first show that, under fairly weak con-
ditions, the stop/play decision amounts to a 
choice between receiving the current stake 
x with certainty and a lottery in which they 
receive  2x with probability  p and  a with prob-
ability  1 − p , where  a represents the option 
value of coming back in the next show.53 
They then specify a probit model for the 
stop/play decision and estimate the degree 
of risk aversion. For the CRRA specification, 
they estimate coefficients of relative risk 
aversion ranging from  0.42 (assuming zero 
wealth) to  6.99 (assuming wealth of 50,000 
Dutch guilders) to  13.08 (assuming wealth 
of 100,000 Dutch guilders). For the CARA 
specification, they estimate a coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion of  0.12 .
Most of the subsequent papers in the 
game-show literature use data from the 
United States and international ver-
sions of Deal or No Deal. For surveys, see 
Andersen et al. (2008), Post et al. (2008), 
and Hartley, Lanot, and Walker (2014). Two 
exceptions are Fullenkamp, Tenorio, and 
Battalio (2003), who use data from Hoosier 
Millionaire, and Hartley, Lanot, and Walker 
(2014), who use data from Who Wants to be 
a Millionaire? Like the pioneering studies, 
many of the subsequent papers work with 
EU models with CRRA and/or CARA util-
ity (e.g., Fullenkamp, Tenorio, and Battalio 
2003; Andersen et al. 2008; Deck, Lee, and 
Reyes 2008; Conte et al. 2012; Hartley, 
Lanot, and Walker 2014). Others go beyond 
EU and consider RDEU, prospect theory, or 
other non-EU models (e.g., Botti et al. 2008; 
Post et al. 2008; Mulino et al. 2009; de Roos 
and Sarafidis 2010; Bombardini and Trebbi 
2012).
53 Under the rules of the game, if contestants lose, they 
can come back in the next show unless the current show 
is their third. 
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5.4 Health-Insurance Data
Recently, a growing empirical literature 
has made use of structural models of deci-
sion making under uncertainty to answer a 
variety of important questions about health- 
insurance markets. These include, inter 
alia, the welfare cost of inertia and imper-
fect information in health insurance and the 
implications of adverse selection and moral 
hazard in these markets.
However, the health insurance field con-
text has not been used for estimation of risk 
preferences as the object of fundamental 
interest. We suspect the reason is that estima-
tion of risk preferences when using health- 
insurance choices is more challenging than 
it is when using property-insurance choices 
for at least three reasons. First, the set of 
outcomes associated with each lottery is 
significantly more complex; for example, 
health expenses have (essentially) a contin-
uous distribution. Second, individuals may 
care about more than mere monetary costs 
of care; for example, the quality of their life 
is differentially impacted by different health 
outcomes. The researcher then either needs 
to model the utility from each possible health 
status directly, or to monetize health status. 
Third, moral hazard is likely to be a larger 
concern in this context. In particular, if indi-
viduals’ choices of health-insurance plans 
are subject to selection on moral hazard, this 
selection cannot be ignored in the estimation 
of preferences.54
Even when the ultimate target of the anal-
ysis is not estimation of risk preferences, the 
literature studying health-insurance choices 
needs to contend with the difficulties listed 
54 Yet another issue is that health-insurance plans can be 
quite complex, and thus there might be issues of consumer 
competence with these plans that bias the estimation of 
risk preferences. Indeed, Bhargava, Loewenstein, and 
Sydnor (2017) find evidence of large numbers of employ-
ees at one company choosing health-insurance plans that 
are dominated by other available options. 
above. One approach has been to not model 
directly individuals’ risk aversion and sim-
plify the problem by posing a reduced-form 
equation for individuals’ valuation of health 
insurance plans; see for example Starc 
(2014). Another approach has been to exog-
enously impose risk preferences, as opposed 
to estimating risk preferences within a larger 
model. See, for example, Einav, Finkelstein, 
and Schrimpf (2010), who use external data 
to calibrate the values for risk aversion (as 
well as other parameters that would only be 
identified via functional form assumptions in 
their model).
Because of this, we substantially limit 
the depth of our coverage of this literature. 
Nevertheless, we highlight a few recent 
papers that address some of these challenges 
and estimate a fully specified EU model with 
CARA preferences. In certain cases, these 
papers also allow for preference heterogene-
ity across individuals. We expect that these 
contributions could facilitate future work 
that focuses on estimating risk preferences.
Handel (2013) leverages a major change to 
insurance provision that occurred at a large 
firm to quantify the welfare cost of consumer 
inertia in health insurance markets, and to 
study policies that could mitigate this inertia. 
In order to make progress on this import-
ant question, Handel assumes away two of 
the challenges listed above: he assumes that 
there is no moral hazard and that individuals 
base their choice of insurance plan only on 
the monetary costs of each option. However, 
Handel uses a very careful approach 
to account for complex lotteries over 
outcomes.
Handel (2013) observes households 
choosing among three “preferred provider 
organization” (PPO) plans, denoted PPO 250 , 
PPO 500 and PPO 1200 . These PPO plans dif-
fer among each other in their premiums and 
cost-sharing characteristics (e.g., deductible, 
coinsurance, and out-of-pocket maximums). 
These characteristics, in turn, determine the 
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mapping from total medical expenditures to 
employee out-of-pocket expenditures.
The households in the sample are 
observed making insurance-plan choices at 
multiple points in time. Specifically, at time 
t = 0 , they are observed making an “active” 
choice, because the company changed the 
plans offered (their premiums and cost-shar-
ing characteristics) and the households had 
to choose a plan among the new offerings. 
At times  t = 1 and  t = 2, households are 
observed making (potentially) “passive” 
choices, in the sense that they may simply 
continue with the plan chosen at time  t = 0 
without reassessing their options. Of notice is 
the fact that, over time, the PPO 250 (the plan 
that yields the more comprehensive cover-
age) becomes substantially more expensive, 
while the PPO 500 (a plan that yields a lower 
coverage) becomes substantially less expen-
sive; see figure 2 in Handel (2013). As such, 
choices that were optimal at time  t = 0 need 
not be optimal at times  t = 1, 2. 
Handel’s interest is in quantifying the 
effect of the inertia displayed by individuals 
who do not change their plan over time. To 
achieve this goal, he sets up a random-util-
ity model of insurance choice, similar to the 
one in BMOT described above. One import-
ant difference is that, in the case of health 
insurance, the lottery is defined over out-
of-pocket expenditures, rather than over 
binary outcomes. The distribution of out-of-
pocket expenditures is assumed known by 
the households. In practice, it is estimated 
using medical predictive software, house-
hold characteristics, and ex post claim real-
izations. Specifically, for each individual and 
open enrollment period, the author uses the 
past year of diagnoses, drugs, and expenses, 
along with age and gender, to predict mean 
total medical expenditures for the upcom-
ing year using the Johns Hopkins ACG 
Case-Mix software package. He then incor-
porates medically relevant metrics such as 
type and duration of specific conditions, as 
well as comorbidities. This is done for four 
distinct types of expenditures: (i) pharmacy; 
(ii) mental health; (iii) physician office visit; 
and (iv) hospital, outpatient, and all other. 
Individuals are then grouped into cells deter-
mined by the mean predicted future utiliza-
tion. For each expenditure type and risk cell, 
Handel estimates a spending distribution for 
the upcoming year based on ex post observed 
cost realizations, combining the marginal 
distributions across expenditure categories 
into joint distributions using empirical cor-
relations and copula methods. He then maps 
individual total expense projections into the 
family out-of-pocket expense projections, 
taking into account family-level plan char-
acteristics. This yields the distribution of 
out-of-pocket expenditures to be used in the 
choice model.
The effect of inertia is modeled as an 
additive “consumption” term that is positive 
for the chosen option in the previous year, 
yielding
   c 0 =   w 0 −  p 0 −  e 0 ,
   c 1 =   w 1 −  p 1 −  e 1 + ηI(I C 1 = I C 0 ), 
where  c t denotes consumption,  w t denotes 
wealth,  p t denotes price of insurance,  e t 
denotes out-of-pocket expenditure, each at 
time  t ∈ { 0, 1},  I C t denotes insurance plan 
chosen at time  t ∈ { 0, 1}, and  I( ⋅ ) is the indi-
cator function of the event in parenthesis. 
In addition, for households with a very high 
medical expenditure risk, the consumption 
equation includes an additional dummy vari-
able that puts additional weight on the most 
comprehensive choice,  P 250 , to capture the 
idea that essentially all of these households 
have chosen  P 250 . 
The so-specified consumption enters 
a CARA utility function, which in turn 
households use to evaluate the three PPO 
options (by integrating it against the distri-
bution of out-of-pocket expenditure). Then 
539Barseghyan et al.: Estimating Risk Preferences in the Field
 households choose the option with the high-
est EU.
The coefficient of risk aversion  r is mod-
eled as a random coefficient (following a 
normal distribution with mean specified as 
a linear function of observable characteris-
tics), while the coefficient of inertia  η is mod-
eled as a linear function of family status and 
demographics. The resulting econometrics 
model is a mixed logit and is estimated via 
MCMC. Unobserved heterogeneity in risk, 
however, is not allowed for.
The estimates of the coefficient of abso-
lute risk aversion are similar in magni-
tude to the ones in BMOT, and they lie in 
 [1.9, 3.25 ] ⋅  10 −4 . The intercept in the iner-
tia function,  η, is estimated to be large in 
magnitude with values of $1,729 for single 
employees and of $2,480 for employees who 
cover at least one dependent. Because inertia 
is linked to multiple dimensions of observ-
able heterogeneity, Handel also reports the 
estimated mean and variance of inertia: 
The mean total money left on the table per 
employee due to inertia is $2,032 with a stan-
dard deviation of $446.
A natural extension of Handel’s (2013) 
model is to study additional frictions that may 
affect an individual’s choice of insurance plans. 
For example, Handel and Kolstad (2015) study 
the effect of information frictions and hassle 
costs, measured via a survey administered to 
individuals for whom health-insurance infor-
mation is available. The survey elicits indi-
viduals’ information about available medical 
providers/treatments and perceived time and 
hassle costs to learn the characteristics of a 
high-deductible health-insurance plan (which 
is cheaper than the other options). The addi-
tional friction measures appear to be import-
ant predictors of choices and to significantly 
decrease risk preference estimates.
Einav et al. (2013) address the difficul-
ties associated with evaluation of outcomes 
in the health insurance context, as well as 
the presence of moral hazard. In particular, 
moral hazard and its impact on selection is 
the focus of their paper.
The authors begin their analysis with the 
key observation that households’ utilization 
rate of medical services may depend signifi-
cantly on the characteristics of their health 
insurance coverage. They propose the fol-
lowing simple model, which builds on a 
model in Cardon and Hendel (2001). Each 
period is divided into two subperiods. In the 
second subperiod, households take insurance 
coverage as given, and their utility function is 
assumed separable in health and money
  u(m; λ, ω)  = h(m − λ; ω)  + y(m) , 
where  m is the monetary value of the health 
care utilization chosen;  λ is the monetary 
value of the health shock;  y(m) is the resid-
ual income, which is decreasing in  m at a 
rate that depends on the health-insurance 
coverage; and  ω is a parameter that captures 
households’ responsiveness to the price of 
medical utilization.
The authors assume that  h(m − λ; ω) 
= m − λ −  1 ___ 
2ω (m − λ) 2 and that, under 
insurance contract  j, the marginal cost of 
health care is  c j (i.e.,  y ′ (m)  = − c j ). It follows 
that the optimal amount of utilization is
(7)  m j ∗ (λ)  = λ + ω(1 −  c j ). 
While these assumptions are quite strong, 
they play a key role in keeping the model 
tractable. In particular, through equation 
(7) the authors assure that the health shock 
contributes to utilization additively separably 
from the contribution of moral hazard.
Denoting by  F λ ( ⋅ ) the distribution of the 
health shock, the authors aim at identifying 
F λ ( ⋅ ) and  ω. To argue that these functionals 
are point identified, the authors rely heavily 
on (i) the fact that incremental utilization, 
which is observed, does not depend on risk 
aversion, but on  ω; and (ii) that the data 
contains a plausibly exogenous change in 
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the entire menu of health coverage options. 
First, the authors consider a counter-factual 
(but ideal) data setting in which one observes 
each household’s entire distribution of med-
ical expenditure for two different coverages 
(denoted  I and  II ), call them  G i I (m) and 
G i II (m) . Assuming that the distribution of 
observed health shocks  F λ ( ⋅ ) is the same 
under both coverages, using the fact that 
expenditure should equal  λ + ω(1 −  c j ), and 
denoting by  E  G i k  (m) the expected value of uti-
lization under distribution  G i k (m),  k ∈ { I, II} , 
it immediately follows that the difference 
 (  E  G i I  (m)  −  E  G i II  (m))/(  c I −  c II ) uncovers the 
parameter  ω. The distribution  F i, λ ( ⋅ ) for 
each individual  i can also be learned. This is 
because the authors observe panel data. If 
individuals within this panel are observed for 
a sufficiently long period under the different 
coverages, and if  F i, λ ( ⋅ ) is time invariant, 
then  F i, λ ( ⋅ ) can be learned recalling that λ it =  m it −  ω i (1 −  c t ), with  t denoting time 
period.
Risk aversion is introduced in the analy-
sis by monetizing the second-period utility 
 u(  m j ∗ (λ); λ, ω) and using this object as the 
argument of a CARA utility function with 
coefficient of risk aversion  r. Hence, the EU 
from coverage  j in this model is
 E U j ω = − 1 __r  ∫    exp (−u( m j ∗ (λ); λ, ω)) d F λ (λ). 
An individual specific coefficient of standard 
risk aversion  r i can then be identified if indi-
viduals face a continuous option set.
The authors argue that the data they have 
comes sufficiently close to this ideal scenario. 
Specifically, their data hails from Alcoa, Inc., 
a large multinational producer of alumi-
num and related products, and it comprises 
health insurance choices and medical care 
utilization of their US-based workers (and 
their dependents). The analysis in this paper 
focuses mostly on data from the years 2003 
and 2004. The data are very rich, document-
ing health insurance options and choices, 
claim information, demographic characteris-
tics of households, etc., as well as a summary 
proxy of individuals’ health-care utilization 
based on predictive medical software.
For this paper, the distinctive feature of 
the data is that in 2004 Alcoa introduced a 
new set of health insurance PPO options, 
which were phased in gradually to different 
employees based on their union affiliation, 
since new benefits could only be introduced 
when an existing union contract expired. 
The staggered timing in the transition from 
one set of insurance options to another 
provides a plausibly exogenous source of 
variation in coverage (mimicking the possi-
bility of observing distributions  G i I (m) and 
 G i II (m) from the ideal scenario) which is, as 
discussed above, the key to identification. 
Prior to 2004, there were three PPO options 
under the old benefits and five entirely dif-
ferent PPO options under the new benefits. 
Hence, workers were forced to make an active 
choice.
In practice, to estimate the model the 
authors impose a parametric structure on 
the distribution function  F λ ( ⋅ ) and on the 
form of unobserved heterogeneity. Because 
of the model’s fairly complex structure, 
estimation is carried out via MCMC. The 
estimation exercise yields an average coeffi-
cient of absolute risk aversion of  1.9 ⋅  10 −3 , 
with a large standard deviation of  2 ⋅  10 −3 . 
However, in this exercise risk aversion is no 
longer specified over financial outcomes, 
but over realized utility. As such, these esti-
mates are not directly comparable to those 
obtained in the papers discussed earlier in 
this section.
The average value for  ω is about $1,300, 
which corresponds to one-third of the 
average health risk (about $4,340) per 
employee-year. In other words, on average, 
moving from no insurance to full insurance 
yields an increase in medical utilization of 
$1,300.
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The authors interpret the parameter  ω as 
(a measure of) moral hazard. In essence,  ω 
maps the change in health insurance cover-
age into a change in utilization rate. And just 
like in the textbook version of adverse selec-
tion, ceteris paribus, individuals with higher 
moral hazard (higher  ω ) will have higher 
willingness to pay for insurance and will be 
more costly to insure.
6. Estimation with Aggregate Data
In this section, we turn our attention to 
research that estimates risk preferences using 
aggregate data. As in the prior section, we 
first discuss the general approach, and then 
review how that approach has been applied 
in several different contexts. Aggregate data 
has the major advantage that it is more easily 
obtained than individual-level data. As will 
become clear, however, estimation of risk 
preferences using aggregate data typically 
requires stronger assumptions about the 
underlying environment.
6.1 The General Approach
Estimating risk preferences from aggre-
gate data requires steps that are similar to 
the ones faced when working with individ-
ual-level data, though with more structure 
imposed:
Step 1: Identify a field context in which 
economic agents make choices between 
options that involve risk, and where those 
choices determine some observed mar-
ket aggregate for which the researcher can 
obtain data. Examples include asset prices, 
consumption aggregates, and labor supply 
elasticities.
Step 2: Translate the (typically) rich field 
environment into a well-defined market equi-
librium model. Specifically, develop a model 
of choice (as in step 2 for  individual-level 
data) and a model of market forces such that, 
for the model of risk preferences under con-
sideration, the market equilibrium model 
generates a prediction for the observed equi-
librium market aggregates as a function of 
the taste parameters.
When using aggregate data, researchers 
frequently assume a representative agent, 
sometimes for simplicity—in particular, to 
make it easier to derive the mapping from 
model parameters to observed market 
aggregates—and sometimes due to there 
being limited information in the data from 
which one could identify either observed 
or unobserved heterogeneity. Recently, 
however, some researchers have shown 
that if one observes (arguably) the same 
set of agents interacting in multiple mar-
kets, then one can leverage techniques 
from the empirical industrial organization 
literature to estimate a model with hetero-
geneity in beliefs or in preferences (see 
section 6.2.2).
6.2 Betting Markets
A large literature estimates risk pref-
erences using aggregate odds data from 
pari-mutuel horse races. In a pari-mutuel 
horse race, the total amount wagered net of 
a house take is distributed among the win-
ning bettors in proportion to their individual 
bets. Specifically, suppose there are  n horses 
in a race, and the share of the betting pool 
wagered on horse  i is  s i . If the house take 
is  τ , the net return on a one-dollar bet on 
horse  i , or equivalently the “odds” on horse  i , 
is given by 
(8)  R i =  1 − τ _____ s i  − 1. 
Typically, researchers working in this field 
context have access to data that contain, 
for each race, an observed vector of odds 
 R = ( R 1 , … ,  R n ) and the identity of the 
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 winning horse (and sometimes also the iden-
tity of the other horse placements). The 
literature takes advantage of the fact that, 
from  R , one can mechanically compute the 
house take and the vector of betting shares. 
Specifically, using the fact that the betting 
shares must sum to one,
(9)  1 − τ =  ( ∑ i=1
n
  1 ______ 
1 +  R i ) 
−1
 . 
The betting shares are then computed using 
equation (8): 
(10)  s i =  (1 − τ) _______(1 +  R i ) . 
Hence, the literature typically takes  R ,  s , and 
τ to be observed.55
The conceptual framework behind the 
estimation of preferences from such data is 
as follows. The underlying primitives of a 
race are the house take  τ and a vector of win 
probabilities  p ≡ (  p 1 , … ,  p n ) ≫ 0 , where  p i 
is the probability that horse  i wins the race.56 
Given a specific vector of odds  R , bettors’ 
preferences determine which horse they bet 
on, which in turn determines a set of mar-
ket shares  s ≡ (  s 1 , … ,  s n ) . In equilibrium, 
the odds must adjust such that the shares 
implied by bettor behavior correspond to 
the shares implied by the pari-mutuel pric-
ing rule (equations (9) and (10)). The goal 
is to use the observed equilibrium odds and 
race outcomes to make inferences about the 
unobserved preferences.
55 To be precise, while a specific  s can be associated with 
multiple  R via different  τ , any observed  R is associated 
with a unique pair  (s, τ) . 
56 Here in section 6.2, in the interest of using notation 
consistent with that in the betting-markets literature, we 
make a temporary shift in our notation and use  p to denote 
probabilities (as opposed to prices). 
6.2.1 Representative Agent Framework
Most studies that use pari-mutuel horse 
race data adopt a representative agent 
framework. The key implication is that, for 
each race, the equilibrium odds  R must be 
such that the representative agent is indiffer-
ent between betting on all horses in the race.
The earliest research in this area effec-
tively tests whether bettors maximize 
expected value. In a seminal paper, Griffith 
(1949) uses data on a sample of 1,386 US 
horse races to study bettors’ subjective risk 
perceptions. Griffith takes bettors’  subjective 
win probabilities (which he labels the “psy-
chological odds”) to be the reciprocal of the 
track odds corrected for the house take.57 
He then compares these inferred subjective 
win probabilities to objective win probabili-
ties. To do so, he groups horses into eleven 
odds-groups (e.g., all horses that went off at 
 R i = 1 ,  R i = 2 , etc.), and he compares in 
each group the empirical win frequencies 
and the subjective win probabilities. He 
finds that the subjective win probabilities 
exceed the frequency of winners at short 
odds (corrected odds less than 5.1-to-1), 
while the reverse holds at long odds. This 
phenomenon has come to be known as the 
“favorite–longshot bias.”58
Weitzman (1965) takes a somewhat dif-
ferent approach, effectively using horse race 
data to estimate an EU model. Like Griffith 
(1949), he first estimates the relationship 
between empirical win frequencies and a 
57 In particular, if the subjective win probability is taken 
to be  (1 − τ)/( R i + 1) , then the expected value is the same 
(and equal to  1 − τ ) for bets on all horses. Griffith (1949) 
also adds a correction for “breakage,” wherein tracks round 
the odds downward to the nearest $0.05. 
58 Griffith (1961) reports similar findings in a follow-up 
study in which he turns attention from win bets to show 
bets. McGlothlin (1956) pursues a similar approach to 
Griffith (1949) and reaches the same conclusion using data 
from 9,248 California horse races. He further identifies 
changes in behavior over the course of a day’s races that he 
takes to be inconsistent with the EU model. 
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horse’s odds, using data from over 12,000 
New York horse races. Specifically, for all 
257 observed values of odds  R , he com-
putes the empirical frequency of winners 
 p .59 He then smooths this relationship by 
taking the 257  (R, p) pairs and fitting them to 
a curve  p ̂(R) using weighted least squares.60 
Unlike Griffith (1949), who then uses the 
odds to infer the representative agent’s 
beliefs, Weitzman assumes that the repre-
sentative agent has beliefs that correspond to 
p ̂(R) . Upon assuming that the agent behaves 
according to the EU model, he can infer the 
agent’s utility function over money. In par-
ticular, normalizing  u(0)  = 0 , indifference 
between all bets implies  p ̂(R) u(R)  = C , 
or  u(R)  = C/ p ̂(R) , where  C is a constant 
(reflecting the scale of utility). The esti-
mated shape of  p ̂ (R) implies that  u(R) 
is convex (increasing marginal utility for 
money), suggesting a region of local risk lov-
ing similar to that proposed by Markowitz 
(1952).
The first wave of papers culminates with 
Ali (1977). Using data on more than 20,000 
New York harness races, Ali repeats the anal-
yses of both Griffith (1949) and Weitzman 
(1965). However, he takes a different 
approach to grouping horses. In particular, 
he points out that the approach to estimat-
ing empirical win probabilities as a function 
of odds  R ignores the fact that the relation-
ship might depend on which other horses 
are in the race—e.g., a horse with 3-to-1 
odds might be the favorite, the second favor-
ite, or perhaps even the third favorite, and 
might thus have different win probabilities 
in each of those cases. To account for this, 
he instead groups horses according to “favor-
ites,” where each race will have a favor-
ite, second favorite, third favorite, and so 
59 In his data, odds are observed in $0.05 increments. 
60 He tests several functional forms and concludes that 
the most appropriate function is the hyperbolic form, 
 p ̂(R)  = A / R + B log (1 + R)/R . 
forth.61 It is unclear whether this alterna-
tive grouping is an improvement and, more 
to the point, it is unclear what underlying 
model of preferences might make this partic-
ular grouping the relevant one. However, the 
point Ali raises about the race composition is 
important, and it is picked up by Jullien and 
Salanié (2000).
As in Griffith (1949), Ali first estimates 
the subjective and empirical win proba-
bilities for each of his groupings. He again 
finds evidence of a favorite–longshot bias. 
Specifically, the subjective win probability 
for the favorite is less than the objective win 
probability, whereas for all other horses the 
subjective win probability is larger than the 
objective win probability. As in Weitzman 
(1965), Ali reverts to assuming that the rep-
resentative agent’s beliefs correspond to the 
objective win probabilities. To generate the 
odds associated with each group, he com-
putes a weighted average of the actual odds 
for that group. He can then infer  u(R) for 
each of these values of  R . As in Weitzman 
(1965), the estimated shape of  u(R) is con-
vex. By pursuing both approaches, the paper 
foreshadows the identification problem of 
inferring preferences versus beliefs.
In addition to reporting these empirical 
findings, Ali makes two important theoret-
ical points. First, he observes that the util-
ity function of the representative bettor is 
inconsistent with the EU hypothesis when 
the betting opportunity set is expanded to 
include parlay, martingale, and other com-
pound bets (a point that is leveraged by 
Snowberg and Wolfers 2010; see below). 
Second, he proves that the favorite–longshot 
bias can be explained with bettors that are 
risk neutral EU maximizers but have het-
erogeneous risk perceptions (a point that is 
61 Because the vast majority of races in his sample have, 
at most, eight horses, Ali (1977) carries out his analysis for 
the first eight favorites. 
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developed by Gandhi and Serrano-Padial 
2015; see below).
Jullien and Salanié (2000) initiated a sec-
ond wave of research using pari-mutuel 
horse race data that uses more sophisticated 
econometric techniques to estimate risk 
preferences. They use data from more than 
34,000 horse races in Great Britain. In the 
spirit of Weitzman (1965), they assume that 
bettors’ beliefs correspond to the objective 
win probabilities, and then estimate several 
different models of risk preferences, namely, 
EU, RDEU, and CPT.
Jullien and Salanié had a key innovation 
that solves the issue raised by Ali (1977) 
that the probability of a horse winning a 
race depends on the other horses in the 
race. Specifically, they use the fact that, as 
long as bettors’ preferences satisfy certain 
conditions, any vector of observed odds 
 R ≡ (  R 1 , … ,  R n ) implies a unique underlying 
vector of win probabilities  p ≡ (  p 1 , … ,  p n ) . 
Hence, if one can derive the mapping from 
 R to  p , one can use maximum likelihood 
to find the preferences that make the 
 model-implied win probabilities as close as 
possible to the empirical win frequencies 
observed in the data on a race-by-race basis.
Formally, they assume a large number of 
identical bettors. Each bettor bets a fixed 
amount  a in each race (and doesn’t con-
sider the possibility of not betting), bets that 
entire amount on one horse, and these bets 
cover every horse in the race.62 The bettors 
have identical preferences wherein the util-
ity from betting  a on horse  i is  V( R i ,  p i , θ) , 
where  θ is a vector that parametrizes pref-
erences—i.e., for any particular model of 
risk preferences that they consider, the goal 
will be to estimate the vector  θ . Under these 
assumptions, the market odds  R in each race 
62 Jullien and Salanié (2000) emphasize that their 
approach, in principle, allows for insider traders and noise 
traders, as long as the share of such traders is small enough 
that they don’t influence the market odds. 
will adjust such that the utility from betting 
on all horses in that race is the same: 
(11)  V( R 1 ,  p 1 , θ)  = ⋯ = V( R n ,  p n , θ) . 
Jullien and Salanié argue that, as long as  V is 
continuous and increasing in  R i and  p i (i.e., 
satisfies first-order stochastic dominance), 
then each pair  (R, θ) generates a unique vec-
tor of win probabilities  p .63
With this result in hand, Jullien and Salanié 
(2000) can estimate  θ using maximum likeli-
hood. For each race, they number horses so 
that horse  1 is the winner. Indexing races by 
c = 1, … , C , the log-likelihood for the sam-
ple is 
  L C (θ)  =  ∑ 
c=1
C
 log  p 1 (  R c , θ) ,
where  R c are the observed odds for race  c 
and  p 1 (  R c , θ) is the objective win probability 
for the winning horse implied by  R c and  θ .
Jullien and Salanié (2000) first apply this 
approach to EU models. Here, the market 
equilibrium condition (11) implies
 p i u(w + a  R i , θ)  + (1 −  p i )u(w − a, θ)  
= constant for all i = 1, … , n, 
where  w is the bettor’s initial wealth. 
Using these  n equations and the fact that 
 ∑ i=1 n  p i = 1 , they obtain
 p i (R, θ) =   [u(w + a  R i , θ)  − u(w − a, θ)] 
−1 
   ________________________  
 ∑ j=1 n  [u(w + a  R j , θ)  − u(w − a, θ)] −1  . 
63 Jullien and Salanié (2000) formally prove that, for 
any  θ , there is a one-to-one relationship between  R and  p . 
However, they do not explicitly address the conditions 
required for how  V depends on  θ to ensure a one-to-one 
relationship between  (R, θ) and  p , which is what would be 
needed for full identification of  θ . For models in which  θ is 
unidimensional and changes in  θ have a monotonic impact 
on risk aversion—as in single parameter EU models—the 
latter would clearly be satisfied. For models in which  θ is 
multidimensional, it might not be satisfied. 
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Estimation of the EU model with a CARA 
utility function  u(x, θ)  = (1 − exp (−θx))/θ 
(for which only  θa is identified) yields an 
estimate of  θ ̂a = − 0.055 , thereby indicat-
ing that bettors are risk loving. This result 
is consistent with the findings in Weitzman 
(1965) and Ali (1977), and follows from the 
fact that their data again contains evidence of 
a favorite–longshot bias. Similar results are 
obtained with a HARA utility function.
Jullien and Salanié (2000) next estimate 
various RDEU models. With RDEU, the 
market equilibrium condition implies
 π(  p i , θ) u(w + a  R i , θ)
  + (1 − π(  p i , θ)) u(w − a, θ)  = constant
for all i = 1, … , n. 
Much as under EU, one can use these  n 
equations, the inverse function of  π( ⋅ , θ) , and 
the fact that  ∑ i=1 n  p i = 1 to obtain  p i (R, θ) . 
They assume a CARA utility function, and 
functional forms for  π( ⋅ , θ) include a power 
function and those proposed by Lattimore, 
Baker, and Witte (1992) and Prelec (1998).64 
The estimation results indicate that a power 
function and the Lattimore, Baker, and Witte 
(1992) function do not fit the data better than 
the EU model (in the sense of value of the 
likelihood function), and that the estimate 
 θ ̂a is essentially unaffected. Estimation of the 
Prelec (1998) model yields a better fit to the 
data and suggests rejection of EU in favor of 
RDEU. However, the estimated weighting 
function is quite close to the diagonal.
Finally, Jullien and Salanié (2000) estimate 
CPT models. With CPT, and assuming that 
64 In fact, they separately estimate the Lattimore, 
Baker, and Witte (1992) function and the Cicchetti and 
Dubin (1994) function, but the latter is equivalent to the 
former (with a simple change in variables). 
w is the reference point, the market equilib-
rium condition implies
 π + (  p i , θ) u(a R i , θ)  +  π − (1 −  p i , θ) u(−a, θ) 
= constant for all i = 1, … , n. 
The approach to solving for  p i (R, θ) is anal-
ogous, except that permitting  π + to differ 
from  π − requires that they solve for  p i (R, θ) 
numerically rather than analytically.65 They 
again assume a CARA utility function, and 
functional forms for  π + ( ⋅ , θ) and  π − ( ⋅ , θ) 
include a power function and that proposed 
by Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992).66 In 
each case, the estimate  θ ̂a is not far from 
what is obtained for the EU model, the prob-
ability weighting function for gains is slightly 
convex but not significantly so, but the prob-
ability weighting function for losses is highly 
and significantly concave, leading to a clear 
rejection of EU.
Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) revisit the 
favorite–longshot framing of the data as in 
Griffith (1949) and Weitzman (1965), and 
investigate whether it is driven by risk love 
(increasing marginal utility) or by risk misper-
ceptions (probability distortions). As in Ali 
(1977), either model can fully explain data 
on win bets. The fundamental insight used 
for identification is that the so-estimated 
models will have different implications for 
bettors’ decisions over a wider choice set (as 
suggested by Ali 1977), in particular for com-
pound bets in the exacta, quinella, or trifecta 
pools.67 Snowberg and Wolfers’s data cover 
65 Given computing power at the time, they thus used 
a small subset of the data and considered a more limited 
set of models. 
66 By assuming a CARA utility function, Jullien and 
Salanié (2000) effectively assume that there is no dimin-
ishing sensitivity or loss aversion (see section 3.3). In par-
ticular, the estimates would be the same if  u(a R i , θ) and 
u(−a, θ) were replaced with  u(w + a R i , θ) and  u(w − a, θ) . 
67 An exacta is a bet on both which horse will come in 
first and which will come in second. A quinella is a bet on 
two horses to come in first and second in either order. A 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LVI (June 2018)546
every horse race run in North America from 
1992 to 2001, including the finishing posi-
tion of each horse, the win odds on each 
horse, and the realized payoffs for exactas, 
quinellas, and trifectas. As in the prior lit-
erature, Snowberg and Wolfers take a rep-
resentative-agent approach: they assume a 
large number of identical bettors, where 
each bets a fixed amount of $1 in each race 
(or can choose not to bet), and bets that $1 
on (at most) one horse. Hence, again the 
market odds will be such that the utility of 
all bets (and the utility of not betting) are 
all the same.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, 
Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) use race results 
to estimate how the win probability depends 
on the odds. They pursue an approach simi-
lar to Weitzman (1965), first calculating the 
empirical frequency of winners for each value 
of odds  R observed in the data, and then using 
Lowess smoothing to estimate a function 
 p ̂(R) .68
Next, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) 
separately fit the EU model and the risk 
misperception model to the estimated  p ̂(R) 
function. For the EU model, they assume 
that bettors’ beliefs correspond to  p ̂(R) , in 
which case, the market equilibrium condition 
implies
  p ̂( R i )u(w +  R i ) + (1 −  p ̂(  R i )) u(w − 1)  
   = u(w)  for all i = 1, … , n. 
Normalizing  w = 0 , normalizing util-
ity to zero if the bet is lost ( u(−1)  = 0 ), 
trifecta is a bet on which horse will come in first, which 
second, and which third. 
68 They actually estimate a smooth function for the rate 
of return as a function of  R , but since the rate of return is 
equal to  pR , this is equivalent to estimating a smooth func-
tion for the win probability  p ̂(R) . 
and  normalizing utility to one if the bettor 
chooses not to bet ( u(0)  = 1 ), this becomes
(12)   p ̂( R i ) u( R i ) = 1 ⇒ u(  R i ) =  1 ____  p ̂(  R i ) ,  
i = 1, … , n. 
In other words, a utility function  u(R) 
= 1 / p ̂(R) perfectly fits the estimated  p ̂(R) 
function. The so-estimated  u(R) is, not sur-
prisingly, convex—as we have seen, explain-
ing the favorite–longshot bias with an EU 
model requires a risk-loving utility function. 
While they prefer (and use below) this non-
parametric estimate for  u(R) , they also argue 
that a CARA utility function fits the data rea-
sonably well.
For the risk-misperception model, they 
assume that bettors have a linear utility 
function  u(x)  = x . Letting  π(p) denote the 
misperceived win probability associated 
with objective win probability  p , the market 
equilibrium condition implies
  π( p ̂( R i ))  R i + (1 − π( p ̂( R i ))) (−1)  = 0
   or π( p ̂(  R i )) (  R i + 1)  = 1 
for all i = 1, … , n. 
Letting  R ̂ (p) denote the inverse of  p ̂(R) , 
it follows that a risk-misperception func-
tion  π(p)  = 1 / ( R ̂ (p)  + 1) perfectly fits the 
estimated  p ̂(R) function. The so-estimated 
π(p) indicates significant overestimates of 
small probabilities, exactly what is needed 
to explain the favorite–longshot bias. Again, 
while they prefer (and use below) this non-
parametric estimate for  π(p) , they also argue 
that a one-parameter probability weighting 
function as in Prelec (1998) fits the data rea-
sonably well.
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Finally, in step 3, having established that 
either model can perfectly fit data on win 
bets, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) turn to 
compound bets. They (and we) outline their 
approach only for exacta bets (in which the 
bettor wagers that horse  A will come in first 
and horse  B will come in second); analogous 
approaches are used for quinella and trifecta 
bets. For exacta bets, they do not observe 
the odds for all combinations of horses, 
but rather only the odds for the winning 
 combination. Hence, they use the two esti-
mated models from step 2 to generate, for 
each race, model-predicted exacta odds  E ̂ AB 
for the winning combination, and then com-
pare those to the observed exacta odds  E AB . 
In other words, they investigate which esti-
mated model from step 2 best predicts the 
observed exacta odds.
Letting  p B|A denote the probability that 
horse  B is second given that horse  A wins, 
the predicted exacta odds can be derived 
much as in step 2:69
 EU:
 p A  p B|A u( E ̂ AB ) = 1 ⇒  E ̂ AB =  u −1 ( 1 ______  p A  p B|A ) ;
Risk Misperception:
π( p A )π( p B|A )( E ̂ AB + 1)  = 1
 ⇒  E ̂ AB =  1 ___________ π( p A )π(  p B|A ) − 1. 
For each race,  p A and  π(  p A ) can be derived 
from  R A as in step 2. The key question is 
how to derive  p B|A and  π(  p B|A ) . Snowberg 
and Wolfers pursue two approaches, both 
of which yield the same conclusions. 
First, they use Harville’s (1973) formula, 
69 The risk-misperception model here assumes that 
bettors fail to reduce the compound lottery inherent in an 
exacta—i.e., they do not use  π(  p A  p B|A ) . 
which yields  p B|A =  p B / (1 −  p A ) or  π(  p B|A ) = π(  p B ) / (1 − π(  p A )) , where  p B and  π(  p B ) 
can be derived from  R B as in step 2.70 Second, 
they estimate  p ̂(  R B |  R A ) using a technique 
analogous to how they estimate  p ̂(R) .
They compare models by computing the 
mean absolute prediction error between  E ̂ AB 
and  E AB for each model. Using this metric, 
they find that the estimated risk-misper-
ception model better predicts observed 
odds for exacta bets (and for quinella and 
trifecta bets). The authors thus conclude 
that their “results are more consistent with 
the favorite–long shot bias being driven by 
misperceptions rather than by risk love” 
(p. 744).
6.2.2 Heterogeneity in Beliefs and 
 Preferences
Two recent papers—Gandhi and Serrano-
Padial (2015) and Chiappori et al. (2012)—
investigate the extent to which one can use 
aggregate data on horse races to estimate 
heterogeneity in beliefs and heterogeneity 
in preferences. The key idea in both is that, 
instead of assuming a representative bettor 
who is indifferent between betting on all 
horses in a race, it is assumed that heteroge-
neous bettors partition themselves across the 
horses in a race based on either their beliefs 
or their preferences. If one can observe how 
bettors partition themselves across races with 
different characteristics, one can draw infer-
ence on the distribution of heterogeneity.
Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2015) are 
motivated by the favorite–longshot bias, and 
the idea that belief heterogeneity could drive 
it (as suggested by Ali 1977, theorem 2). 
They develop a formal model of risk-neu-
tral agents with heterogeneous beliefs, and 
prove that such a model would generate a 
favorite-longshot bias. Here, we focus on the 
70 Under Harville’s model, the ratio of the probabili-
ties that any two horses place second does not depend on 
which of the other horses wins. 
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latter part of the paper, where they estimate 
the extent of belief heterogeneity.
Once again, a race consists of a house take 
τ and an objective vector of win probabili-
ties  p ≡ (  p 1 , … ,  p n ) , and all bettors bet the 
same fixed amount. Bettor  t holds beliefs 
 φ t ≡ ( φ 1t , … ,  φ nt ) , where beliefs are hetero-
geneous and thus some bettors have  φ t ≠ p. 
Letting  Q( φ t ; θ) denote a population dis-
tribution of  φ t , the goal is to estimate the 
vector of parameters  θ that characterize  Q . 
Since bettors are risk neutral, bettor  t bets 
on the horse with the largest  φ it  R i . Assuming 
that  Q is continuous, so that a measure zero 
of bettors are indifferent between multiple 
horses, any vector of odds  R will cause bet-
tors to partition themselves such that the 
share betting on horse  i is 
  s i =  Pr Q ( φ it  R i >  φ jt  R j for all j ≠ i) . 
In equilibrium, odds must adjust such that the 
shares implied by this bettor behavior corre-
spond to the shares implied by the  pari-mutuel 
pricing rule (equations (9) and (10)).
Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2015) had the 
key insight that this market is isomorphic to 
a discrete-choice horizontally differentiated 
products market of the form studied by Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Berry, 
Gandhi, and Haile (2013).71 Specifically, 
 φ it  R i >  φ jt  R j is equivalent to  δ i +  ν it > δ j +  ν jt where  δ i = log  p i  R i − log  p 1  R 1 and ν it = log (  p 1 /  φ 1t ) − log (  p i /  φ it ) . Hence, 
instead of focusing on the population distri-
bution  Q( φ t ; θ) , they focus on the popula-
tion distribution  P( ν t ; θ) . The market shares 
can now be written as
  s i =  Pr P ( δ i +  ν it >  δ j +  ν jt for all j ≠ i) , 
71 In an appendix, they describe how this approach can 
be extended to permit risk-averse bettors. 
which is the familiar form in the dis-
crete-choice literature. Applying results 
from that literature, for any continuous 
 P( ν t ; θ) , one can translate any observed odds 
R into a unique vector of model-implied 
underlying probabilities  p ∗ (R, θ) . One can 
then set up a likelihood function exactly as in 
Jullien and Salanié (2000).
The authors estimate this model—i.e., 
they estimate  P( ν t ; θ) —using a sample of 
more than 176,000 pari-mutuel races that 
were collected from North American tracks 
over 2003–06, consisting of more than 
1,400,000 horse starts.72 Much as in the 
discrete-choice literature, they assume that 
 P( ν t ; θ) takes a logistic form. However, they 
permit a variance mixture of logistic func-
tions. Specifically, they assume 
  P( ν t ; θ)  =  ∑ 
m=1 
M
 ( ∏ i=2
n
 F(  ν it |  σ m )) g( σ m ), 
where  F is a standard logistic distribu-
tion with variance  σ m , and  g( σ m ) is the 
 probability that the population variance 
equals  σ m .73 They interpret  σ m to be a mea-
sure of belief heterogeneity for type  m . The 
authors report results for  M = 1, 2, and  3 . 
A likelihood ratio test rejects the one-type 
model in favor of the two-type model, while 
adding a third type does not significantly 
improve the log-likelihood. In the two-type 
model, they estimate that 70 percent of the 
population have a small  σ = 0.028 , while 30 
percent have a large  σ = 0.503 . The authors 
interpret the former group as having roughly 
correct beliefs (informed traders), and they 
interpret the latter group as having dispersed 
beliefs (noise traders).74
72 As a preliminary step, the authors regress ex post 
return on (log) market shares, and indeed find evidence of 
the favorite–longshot bias in their data. 
73 The authors don’t discuss how this functional-form 
assumption translates into a distribution of the underlying 
beliefs  φ t . 
74 They also estimate a model with risk-averse bettors 
who all have the same CARA utility function, and reach 
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Finally, the authors do some additional 
analysis to further buttress their argument 
that belief heterogeneity is playing an 
important role in this context. First, they use 
their data to estimate a representative agent 
model using the preferred specification of 
Jullien and Salanié (2000), and they conclude 
using a Vuong test that their belief-hetero-
geneity model is statistically better than the 
representative agent model. Second, they 
separately estimate their model on the sub-
samples of maiden and non-maiden races. 
Maiden races are races in which participat-
ing horses have yet to win a single race, and 
thus there is less handicapping information 
about horses in maiden races than in non-
maiden races. Their estimates suggest stable 
proportions of informed versus noise trad-
ers across the two types of races, but lower 
variance estimates for each type of trader in 
the non-maiden races. This result is exactly 
what one might expect if belief heteroge-
neity were playing an important role in this 
environment.
Chiappori et al. (2012) take the opposite 
approach to heterogeneity: they assume 
that bettors have correct (and thus homo-
geneous) beliefs, and estimate a model with 
heterogeneity in preferences. Yet again, a 
race consists of a house take  τ and an objec-
tive vector of win probabilities  p , where the 
authors label the horses in each race such that 
 p 1 > ⋯ >  p n . They assume a continuum of 
bettors who all have beliefs that correspond 
to  p and who all bet the same fixed amount. 
Bettors differ in their utility function, 
V(R, p, θ) , which is the utility from betting on 
a horse that has odds  R and win probability 
p . The parameter  θ captures heterogeneity.
The authors do not put any parametric 
structure on  V , but rather assume that it sat-
isfies a few simple properties. They assume 
that  V is continuous and increasing in  R and 
much the same conclusion about the nature of belief 
heterogeneity. 
p . They assume that  θ is unidimensional 
(i.e.,  θ is a scalar), and without loss of gen-
erality that it is distributed uniformly on the 
interval  [0, 1] . Most importantly,  V satisfies 
a single-crossing property with respect to  θ : 
for any two gambles  (R, p) and  ( R ′ ,  p ′ ) with 
p ′ < p , if, for some  θ ,  V(R, p, θ)  ≤ V( R ′ ,  p ′ , θ) , 
then for all  θ ′ > θ ,  V(R, p,  θ ′ ) < V( R ′ ,  p ′ ,  θ ′ ) . 
Hence,  θ can be interpreted as a taste for 
risk, where the larger  θ is, the more a bettor 
is prone to prefer horses with a lower proba-
bility but higher odds.75
Given this structure, for any fixed  V ,  p , 
and  R such that money is bet on every horse 
(which must hold in equilibrium), bet-
tors partition themselves by  θ : there exists 
 0 =  θ 0 <  θ 1 < ⋯ <  θ n = 1 such that bet-
tors with  θ ∈ (  θ 0 ,  θ 1 ) bet on horse 1, bettors 
with  θ ∈ (  θ 1 ,  θ 2 ) bet on horse 2, and so on 
until bettors with  θ ∈ (  θ n−1 ,  θ n ) bet on horse 
n . In other words, bettors with the lowest 
 θ s, who are most averse to risk, bet on the 
horse with the largest win probabilities, 
and bettors with larger and larger  θ s bet on 
horses with smaller and smaller win prob-
abilities. It follows that market shares as a 
function of odds  R satisfy  s i =  θ i −  θ i−1 . In 
equilibrium, odds must adjust such that the 
shares implied by this bettor behavior equal 
the shares implied by the pari-mutuel pric-
ing rule (equations (9) and (10)).
The authors prove that, for any  V satis-
fying their assumptions, for each race  (p, τ) 
there exists a unique set of equilibrium odds 
R , and moreover for any observed equilib-
rium odds  R , there is a unique vector of win 
probabilities  p that could generate those 
odds. Finally, the authors prove that, if one 
observes the relationship  p(R) , one can 
identify the utility function  V up to an affine 
75 This single-crossing assumption is satisfied for an 
EU model with CARA utility or with CRRA utility. For 
non-EU models, it can be satisfied, though additional 
restrictions are required. In particular, heterogeneity has 
to remain unidimensional. 
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transformation. Hence, in principle one can 
nonparametrically identify  V , and the extent 
of heterogeneity via  V ’s dependence on  θ , 
from the aggregate pricing data.
To relate the nonparametric utility func-
tion  V to various underlying models of pref-
erences, the authors focus on a feature of  V 
known as the “normalized fear of ruin”: 
  NF(R, p, θ)  =  p _____ 
R + 1  
 V p  ___
 V R 
 (R, p, θ). 
Different models of risk preferences have 
different implications for  NF(R, p, θ) —e.g., 
under EU it is independent of  p . To esti-
mate  NF , they propose a two-step proce-
dure. First, they use empirically observed 
outcomes to nonparametrically estimate the 
function  p i (R) .76 Second, with the function 
p i (R) in hand, they are able to estimate the 
NF index at each observation in the data.77 
They implement this approach using a data 
set of more than 53,000 thoroughbred races 
in the United States from 2001 to 2004. They 
then test how well different models of risk 
preferences can explain the variation in the 
estimated  NF index. Of the models consid-
ered, a heterogenous non-EU model with 
non-additive probability weights, in which 
the estimated probability weighting func-
tion is concave and then convex, performs 
best.
The approach in Chiappori et al. (2012) 
has limitations. In particular, the assump-
tion of unidimensional heterogeneity that 
76 This step is analogous to the approach in Weitzman 
(1965) and Snowberg and Wolfers (2010), except that they 
estimate how the probability of horse  i winning depends on 
the full vector of odds  R , as opposed to merely depending 
on  R i . 
77 Here, they do not pursue a maximum-likelihood 
approach as in Jullien and Salanié (2000) and Gandhi and 
Serrano-Padial (2015). Rather, they focus on one particular 
implication of  V that can be non-parametrically identified 
from  p(R) , and which can be used to compute  NF . For 
details, see the paper. 
satisfies the single-crossing property is quite 
restrictive for non-EU models. Also, their 
estimation approach is not as straightforward 
to implement as other approaches in this lit-
erature. That said, their intuition for how to 
identify heterogeneity in preferences from 
aggregate data is quite appealing.
6.3 Consumption, Asset Returns, and Labor 
Supply Data
A number of studies use macroeconomic 
data to estimate risk preferences. Such 
studies typically use a representative-agent 
life-cycle model, and use aggregate data 
to estimate a parameter of that model that 
reflects the representative agent’s degree of 
risk aversion. Here, we describe a few seminal 
papers in this literature, focusing on papers 
in which a major focus is the  estimation of a 
risk parameter. As we highlight below, how-
ever, the parameter estimated differs across 
papers.
Hansen and Singleton (1983) use data on 
consumption and asset returns to estimate a 
life-cycle consumption model. They study a 
single-good economy of identical, infinitely 
lived agents with time-additive EU prefer-
ences. The representative agent in this econ-
omy chooses a stochastic consumption plan 
{  c t } t=0 ∞  to maximize 
(13)  E 0 [ ∑ t=0
∞
  β t u( c t )] ,  
where  E 0 is the expectation conditional on 
information available in period zero,  β > 0 is 
a discount factor, and  u(  c t ) is the per-period 
utility function (which is monthly in the esti-
mation). The representative agent faces the 
sequence of budget constraints 
(14)  c t +  p t ′  x t+1 ≤  ( p t +  d t ) ′  x t ,  
where  x t is a vector of the agent’s holdings of 
n assets in period  t ,  p t is the vector of prices 
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of the  n assets net of any distributions, and 
d t is the vector of distributions in period  t .78
Hansen and Singleton (1983) assume a 
CRRA utility function  u(  c t ) = (  c t 1−ρ − 1)/ 
 (1 − ρ) , and they estimate the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion  ρ . In other words, they 
estimate utility curvature over per-period 
consumption. Given this functional form, 
the first-order necessary conditions for the 
maximization of (13) subject to (14) are given 
by the Euler equations, 
(15)  E t [β (  c t+1  ___ c t  ) 
−ρ
 R it+1 ] = 1,   i = 1, … , n, 
where  E t is the expectation conditional on 
information available in period  t and  R it+1 =  ( p it+1 +  d it+1 ) /  p it is the one-period return 
on asset  i .
By assuming, inter alia, that the joint dis-
tribution of consumption and asset returns 
is log-normal, Hansen and Singleton (1983) 
are able to obtain ML estimates of  ρ and 
β using monthly US data for the period 
February 1959 through December 1978.79 
In general, their estimates of  ρ range 
between zero and two, and their estimates 
of the discount factor  β are less than but 
close to unity. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, they perform various chi-square 
and likelihood-ratio tests that provide sub-
stantial evidence against the model. Of 
course, these tests are joint tests of the 
model’s several restrictions, including the 
preference assumptions (identical agents, 
EU preferences, time additivity, CRRA 
utility, exponential discounting, etc.) and 
78 In Hansen and Singleton (1983), the right-hand 
side of the budget constraint also includes a term explic-
itly measuring the agent’s labor income in period  t . This 
term can be supressed, however, without loss of generality 
(Epstein and Zin 1989, 1991, p. 267). 
79 For aggregate consumption, they use seasonally 
adjusted real consumption at the monthly level. They 
estimate the model using several different monthly asset 
return series. 
the distributional assumption (jointly 
log-normally distributed consumption and 
asset returns), making it impossible to say 
which restrictions are being rejected. For 
this reason, the authors lay out a dual plan 
of pursuing both “models with more gen-
eral specifications of preferences and dis-
tribution-free methods of estimation and 
inference” (Hansen and Singleton 1983, 
p. 264).
In Hansen and Singleton (1982), the 
authors progress their plan to pursue 
distribution-free methods of estimation 
and inference.80 They develop a gener-
alized instrumental variables procedure 
for estimating the parameters of model 
(13)–(14) and implement their proce-
dure using the same monthly data on 
consumption and asset returns used in 
Hansen and Singleton (1983). In brief, 
they first use the Euler equations (15) to 
generate a set of population orthogonality 
conditions, 
(16)  E  
⎡
 ⎢
⎣
⎛
 ⎜
⎝
β  (  c t+1  ___ c t  ) 
−ρ
  R 1t+1 − 1
 ⋮ 
β  (  c t+1  ___ c t  ) 
−ρ
  R nt+1 − 1
⎞
 ⎟
⎠
⊗  z t 
⎤
 ⎥
⎦
= 0, 
where  E is unconditional expectation and the 
vector of instruments  z t comprises lagged 
values of  (  R 1t+1 , …,  R nt+1 ,  c t+1 /  c t ) ′. They 
then use the sample analog of the orthogo-
nality conditions to construct a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator of 
the model parameters. The GMM estimates 
of  ρ and  β are similar to the ML estimates 
reported in Hansen and Singleton (1983). 
Chi-square tests again provide evidence 
against the model, which here may be inter-
preted as direct evidence against the model’s 
preference assumptions.
80 Hansen and Singleton (1982) was published before, 
but apparently written after, Hansen and Singleton (1983).
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The rejection by Hansen and Singleton 
(1982, 1983) of the standard-preference 
assumptions is echoed in the subsequent liter-
ature on the equity premium puzzle (Mehra 
and Prescott 1985).81 In their famous paper, 
Mehra and Prescott consider a variation of 
the standard model studied by Hansen and 
Singleton in which there are two assets: a 
risky equity security and a risk-free debt secu-
rity. Unlike Hansen and Singleton, however, 
Mehra and Prescott do not estimate the mod-
el’s preference parameters. Instead, they cali-
brate the model’s  non-preference parameters 
so that the population mean, variance, and 
autocorrelation of consumption growth match 
their corresponding sample values for the US 
economy between 1889 and 1978. They then 
derive analytical expressions for the expected 
returns on the equity and risk-free securities, 
R e and  R f , in terms of the model’s prefer-
ence parameters,  ρ and  β . Restricting  ρ ≤ 10 
,  β ≤ 1 , and  R f ≤ 0.04 (more than four times 
the average return on the three-month 
Treasury bill during the sample period), they 
find that the maximum equity premium ( 
R e −  R f ) that is consistent with the model 
is less than one percent. In contrast, in their 
data, the historical equity premium (the dif-
ference between the average annual returns 
on the S&P 500 and the three-month Treasury 
bill) was more than six percent.
Motivated in part by the poor empiri-
cal performance of the standard model in 
Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) and 
Mehra and Prescott (1985), and in part by 
concurrent developments in the microeco-
nomics literature on non-EU preferences, 
Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) pursue a 
model with a more general specification of 
 preferences.82 The key innovation of their 
81 For a survey of the literature on the equity premium 
puzzle, see Kocherlakota (1996). See also Siegel and Thaler 
(1997). Campbell (2003) summarizes the larger literature 
on asset price puzzles in macroeconomics. 
82 Weil (1989, 1990) takes a parallel path. 
model is that it disentangles the representa-
tive agent’s degree of risk aversion from his 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In 
the standard model, the coefficient of rela-
tive risk aversion is constrained to equal the 
reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. As a result, an agent with stan-
dard preferences that is very averse to risk 
must also have a very strong preference 
for consumption smoothing. However, this 
is what makes the equity premium a puz-
zle: the high degree of risk aversion that is 
required to explain the historical equity pre-
mium implies an implausibly low elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, given the histori-
cal rate of consumption growth. Accordingly, 
Epstein and Zin investigate whether a 
model that delinks preferences over risk and 
 intertemporal substitution can outperform 
the standard model.
In Epstein and Zin’s model, the repre-
sentative agent’s utility in period  t is defined 
recursively as 
(17)  U t =  [ (1 − β)  c t ς + β  ( E t  [ U t+1 ] 1−ρ )  
ς ___ 
1−ρ ] 
 1 __ς 
 ,  
subject to the sequence of budget con-
straints given by (14). In this formulation, 
ς = 1 − (1 / σ) where σ is the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution,  β > 0 is a dis-
count factor, and  ρ is the coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion. Hence, as in Hansen 
and Singleton (1982, 1983), in terms of risk 
preferences Epstein and Zin (1991) esti-
mate utility curvature over per-period con-
sumption, though with a different functional 
form.
The Euler equations that characterize the 
first-order necessary conditions of the opti-
mal consumption path are 
(18)  E t [β  (  c t+1  ___ c t  ) θ(ς−1) ( m t+1 ) θ−1  R it+1 ] = 1, 
i = 1, …, n,  
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where  θ = (1 − ρ)/ ς and  m t+1 = [(  p t+1 + 
d t+1 )′  x t+1 ] /  p t ′  x t+1 is the one-period return 
on the agent’s asset holdings in period  t . 
Observe that when  ρ = 1 / σ , and thus 
ς = 1 − ρ , the Euler equations (18) reduce 
to (15).
Following the GMM procedure of Hansen 
and Singleton (1982), Epstein and Zin 
(1991) estimate the model using monthly US 
data for the period February 1959 through 
December 1986. They estimate the coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion  ρ to be close 
to one and the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution  σ to be less than one. Moreover, 
Wald and likelihood ratio tests of the restric-
tion  ρ = 1 / σ generally reject the standard 
model. That said, Epstein and Zin’s (1989, 
1991) model does not resolve the equity pre-
mium puzzle, in part reflected by the fact 
that the discount factor  β is often estimated 
to be greater than one.83
In a completely different approach, Chetty 
(2006) analyzes risk preferences using data 
on labor supply. Chetty’s basic insight is that 
the wage elasticity of labor supply, which 
has been estimated in numerous studies 
in labor economics, provides information 
about the curvature of the marginal utility of 
consumption.
Chetty (2006) begins with a standard life-cy-
cle labor-supply model in which a represen-
tative agent chooses a path of consumption 
 {  c t } t=1 T and labor  {  l t } t=1 T to maximize 
 U(  c 1 , … ,  c T ,  l 1 , … ,  l T ) subject to the budget 
constraint
   p 1  c 1 + ⋯ +  p T  c T 
  = y + w(  α 1  l 1 + ⋯ +  α T  l T ), 
83 Another generalization of the standard EU model 
that features prominently in the macro-finance literature 
is the model with habit formation (e.g., Abel 1990, 1999; 
Constantinides 1990; Campbell and Cochrane 1999). 
where  p t is the price of consumption in 
period  t ,  y is unearned income at time 0, and 
w α t is the wage in period  t . Chetty chooses to 
work with the associated indirect utility func-
tion  u(c, l) , where  c ≡  p 1  c 1 + ⋯ +  p T  c T 
represents lifetime consumption expendi-
tures,  l ≡  α 1  l 1 + ⋯ +  α T  l T represents life-
time labor supply, and the budget constraint 
becomes  c = y + wl . He then studies the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion in  u —
that is,
  γ ≡  − u cc (c, l) c _________
 u c (c, l)
 . 
In other words, whereas Hansen and 
Singleton (1982, 1983) and Epstein and 
Zin (1989, 1991) study curvature of the 
 per-period utility function over per-period 
consumption, Chetty studies curvature of 
the indirect utility function with respect to 
lifetime consumption (or, equivalently, life-
time wealth).
Given this model, the first order condition 
with respect to labor is given by 
  w u c (y + wl, l)  = − u l (y + wl, l) . 
Chetty (2006) shows that, with some implicit 
differentiation and algebraic manipulation, 
one can derive that
  γ = − (1 +  wl __y )   ε l, y  ____  ε  l c , w +  (1 +  
y
 __ 
wl)  ε  u c , l , 
where  ε l, y is the income elasticity of labor 
supply,  ε  l c , w is the compensated wage elas-
ticity of labor supply, and  ε  u c , l is the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of consumption with 
respect to labor (which captures any comple-
mentarity between consumption and labor 
supply). Hence, if one has estimates of these 
three elasticities along with values for  y and 
wl , one can obtain an estimate for  γ .
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In his empirical implementation, Chetty 
(2006) takes advantage of a large number of 
existing studies that contain estimates of the 
two needed wage elasticities along with mea-
sures of  y and  wl (in most cases he uses the 
sample means of  y and  wl ). An estimate of 
the elasticity of the marginal utility of con-
sumption with respect to labor is harder to 
come by, but he appeals to evidence on con-
sumption responses to job loss, disability, and 
retirement to conclude that this elasticity is, 
at most, 0.15. Hence, for each existing study 
with estimates for the needed wage elas-
ticities, Chetty provides the corresponding 
coefficient of relative risk aversion  γ under 
an assumption of  ε  u c , l = 0 and of  ε  u c , l = 0.15 . 
Overall, much as in Hansen and Singleton 
(1982, 1983) and Epstein and Zin (1989, 
1991), he finds only modest risk aversion—
the average estimate for  γ is 0.71 in the for-
mer case and 0.97 in the latter case.
7. Directions for Future Research
In this section we discuss a number of 
directions for, and important questions to be 
addressed in, future research.
7.1 Consistency across Contexts
A common assumption in economics is 
that risk preferences are stable across deci-
sion contexts. Under EU, for instance, the 
implication is that multiple risky choices 
by the same agent should reflect the same 
degree of risk aversion (or risk loving). If 
this assumption is correct, then estimates 
of risk preferences derived from choices 
in one context can be used to understand 
and make predictions about the behavior of 
households in other contexts. Assessing the 
empirical validity of the stability assump-
tion is a difficult task. Moreover, it is quite 
possible that risk preferences are stable 
across a certain set of contexts, but not oth-
ers. While there exist a few papers on this 
issue, which we survey below, more work is 
needed.
In an early paper, Wolf and Pohlman (1983) 
compare the risk preferences of a single per-
son—a dealer in US government securities—
in two contexts; a hypothetical gambling 
context and an actual investment context. 
For both cases, they assume that the dealer 
is an EU maximizer with HARA utility. In the 
gambling context, Wolf and Pohlman recover 
the utility parameters from the dealer’s direct 
assessments of six hypothetical lotteries. In 
the investment context, they recover the 
same parameters from the dealer’s bid deci-
sions over a series of twenty-eight Treasury 
bill auctions conducted during a twenty-week 
interval in 1976 along with the dealer’s own 
subjective forecasts of the distribution of 
short-term returns. They find that the dealer 
was about four times more risk averse in the 
actual bid decisions than he was for the hypo-
thetical gambles, leading them to conclude 
that people’s “degree of risk  aversion may 
depend on the specific context in which their 
choices are made” (p. 849).
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum 
(2011) investigate the stability hypothesis 
by examining the choices of 702 households 
across three insurance coverages: auto colli-
sion, auto comprehensive, and home all per-
ils. As in BMOT, they observe for each choice 
the full menu of premium–deductible com-
binations, the household’s chosen deduct-
ible, and the household’s claim rate for that 
coverage (estimated from claims data and 
demographics). Households are assumed to 
have subjective beliefs that correspond to 
their coverage-specific claim rates and to be 
EU maximizers with an NTD utility func-
tion. The authors then focus on the stability 
within a household of the coefficient of abso-
lute risk aversion  r .
Specifically, each choice that a household 
makes implies an interval  [  r ¯,  r ̅] such that any  r ∈ [  r ¯,  r ̅] is consistent with that choice. For instance, if a household chooses a $250 
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deductible on home insurance, there exists 
an  r ¯ such that any  r <  r ¯ would imply the household should choose a deductible larger 
than $250, and there exists an  r ̅ such that 
any  r >  r ̅would imply the household should 
choose a deductible smaller than $250. The 
authors ask, for each household, whether the 
three intervals implied by its three choices 
intersect. If so, any  r contained in the inter-
section can rationalize the household’s 
choices (i.e., the household might have sta-
ble risk preferences); if not, no  r can ratio-
nalize the household’s choices.
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum 
(2011) find that the hypothesis of stable risk 
preferences is rejected by the data. The three 
intervals intersect for only 23 percent of 
households, which is rather low considering 
that, according to the authors’ calculations, 
14 percent of households would have over-
lapping intervals even if households were 
randomly assigned their deductible choices. 
The authors pursue several more sophisti-
cated approaches to demonstrate that the 
conclusion of limited stability is robust. The 
authors further point out that the major 
inconsistency seems to come from house-
holds tending to exhibit greater risk aversion 
in their home deductible choices than they 
do in their auto deductible choices.
Einav et al. (2012) also study the stability 
of risk preferences, although in contrast to 
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011), 
they focus on the null of no stability, and assess 
the extent to which there is a domain-general 
component to risk preferences. They use 
data on the benefits choices of 12,752 Alcoa 
employees in six contexts: health insurance, 
drug insurance, dental insurance, short-term 
disability insurance, long-term disability 
insurance, and 401(k) investments.
Einav et al. (2012) take two complemen-
tary approaches in their analysis. First, they 
take a model-free approach in which they 
rank by risk the options within each context 
and compute the pairwise rank correlations 
in the employees’ choices across contexts. 
They find that an employee’s choice in 
every context is positively correlated with 
his or her choice in every other context, and 
thus conclude that they can reject the null 
hypothesis of no domain-general component 
of risk preferences. Second, they take a mod-
el-based approach that is conceptually sim-
ilar to the approach in Barseghyan, Prince, 
and Teitelbaum (2011). They specify an EU 
model that permits both an individual-spe-
cific coefficient of risk aversion and a con-
text-specific shift in risk preferences (that 
does not vary across employees). The latter 
effect is modeled in a stylized, reduced-form 
way that does not really correspond to any 
underlying model of risk preferences. They 
then choose the context-specific shifts that 
maximize the number of employees for 
whom there exists an individual-specific 
coefficient of risk aversion that, when com-
bined with the context-specific shifts, can 
explain their behavior across all six contexts. 
With this approach, they can fully ratio-
nalize the behavior of roughly 30 percent 
of employees across all six contexts, which 
they take to be further evidence that there 
is a domain-general component of risk pref-
erences (though they acknowledge that the 
size of the context-specific shifts “suggests 
that the implied levels of risk aversion exhib-
ited may be very different across domains, or 
that other effects, such as framing or proba-
bility weighting, are particularly important in 
these contexts” (p. 2634)).
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum 
(2016), discussed in section 5.2, demonstrate 
a close connection between rank correlation 
of choices and stability of risk preferences 
under a probability distortion model. They 
find that stability of risk preferences cannot 
be rejected for roughly five in six house-
holds whose choices are rationalizable by 
the model. They then document that house-
holds’ deductible choices are rank correlated 
across lines of coverage, echoing the finding 
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by Einav et al. (2012), and they show that it is 
stable households who are driving these rank 
correlations.
Moving forward, whether in an EU or a 
non-EU framework, it would be natural to 
consider models of risk preferences that have 
both a permanent (domain-general) and an 
idiosyncratic (context-specific) component. 
As a simple example, in an EU model with 
CRRA utility, one might permit that house-
hold  i ’s coefficient of risk aversion in choice 
c is given by  ρ ic =  ρ ̅ i +  ε ic , where the  ρ ̅ i is 
constant across all of  i ’s choices, while  ε ic is 
drawn separately for each choice that house-
hold  i faces. With appropriate data—and in 
particular with enough observations for each 
household—one could estimate the extent 
and importance of each.
7.2 Combining Experimental and Field 
Data
A special case of the question of con-
sistency across contexts is the question of 
consistency between behavior in labora-
tory experiments and behavior in the field. 
Laboratory research (and, to some extent, 
also survey research) represents a context in 
which a rich set of questions can be asked 
of each individual, and thus a precise esti-
mate of an individual’s risk preferences is, 
in principle, possible. An open question is 
how useful such estimates are for real-world 
applications.
In fact, there is research that starts to 
address this question. Most of this research 
uses surveys to obtain both a measure of risk 
aversion and self-reports of field behavior 
for the same agents. For instance, Barsky 
et al. (1997) use data from the 1992 Health 
and Retirement Study. This survey included 
two hypothetical (binary) choices between 
gambles, framed as whether one would 
give up a safe job for an alternative job that 
is risky. Respondents are categorized into 
four risk groups based on their answers to 
the two questions. The survey also  collects 
 self-reports on various risky behaviors. 
Barsky et al. find that the categorical measure 
of risk preferences is indeed correlated with 
the likelihood of engaging in risky behav-
iors such as smoking, drinking, not having 
insurance, choosing risky employment, and 
holding risky assets. For similar analyses, 
see Guiso and Paiella (2006, 2008) using the 
Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth, and Dohmen et al. (2011) using 
the German Socio-Economic Panel. Also, in 
a development context, Liu (2013) and Liu 
and Huang (2013) study how risk prefer-
ences elicited in a (field) laboratory setting 
correlate, respectively, with the adoption 
of new crops and the usage of pesticide by 
Chinese farmers.
An alternative approach is to gather exper-
imental and field data on arguably the same 
or very similar choices and then investigate 
the extent to which risk preferences esti-
mated on experimental data correspond 
to risk preferences estimated on field data. 
One paper that follows this approach is 
Barseghyan, O’Donoghue, and Xu (2015). 
In an online survey, subjects are presented 
with three deductible choices for property- 
insurance coverages. The choice menus are 
constructed to match closely the deduct-
ible options and prices associated with spe-
cific households in the field data used by 
BMOT. The key difference is that agents in 
the laboratory are provided with their latent 
(objective) claim probabilities, while BMOT 
assume households’ beliefs correspond to 
observed claim probabilities.
Qualitatively, the findings of Barseghyan, 
O’Donoghue, and Xu (2015) confirm the pat-
terns documented with field data (BMOT; 
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum 
2016): probability distortions can rationalize 
the behavior of the vast majority of house-
holds, while the curvature of the utility 
function alone cannot do so. The estimated 
(average)  probability  distortion function is 
increasing in the relevant range and  exhibits 
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significant overweighting. Quantitatively, 
there are interesting differences between 
the laboratory and field findings. There is 
more overweighting in the laboratory than in 
the field, as well as more heterogeneity.
Going forward, we envision more work 
emerging in this area, as more field data 
become available, and researchers are 
granted ways to design surveys that can reach 
(a subset of) subjects in the field data (e.g., as 
in Handel and Kolstad 2015).
7.3 Direct Measurement of Beliefs
When estimating risk preferences from 
field data, a researcher typically faces a fun-
damental identification problem: observed 
choices are often consistent with many com-
binations of decision makers’ risk prefer-
ences and their subjective expectations about 
various outcome probabilities. This problem 
is typically solved in one of two ways. One 
approach is to assume individuals hold objec-
tive expectations. In the insurance context, 
this translates into assuming that individu-
als know the objective claim probabilities 
or the objective health shocks distribution, 
and in the betting context this translates 
into assuming that individuals know horses’ 
objective odds of winning races. The analysis 
then focuses on identification and estimation 
of risk preferences. A second approach is to 
assume that individuals are risk neutral, and 
the analysis focuses on identification and 
estimation of subjective beliefs.84
A different and promising approach for 
solving this identification problem is to mea-
sure probabilistic expectations directly, as 
advocated in Manski (2004). For example, 
one may elicit subjective beliefs on the likeli-
hood of a claim with questions such as: “What 
84 A third approach is to assume more structure in the 
model of risk preferences. For instance, if one imposes 
EU, which in particular assumes that whatever decision 
weights are applied to outcomes must correspond to sub-
jective beliefs, then, with appropriate data, one can iden-
tify both the utility function and subjective beliefs. 
do you think is the percent chance that you 
will experience an auto collision claim within 
the next twelve months?” An important 
aspect of this approach is that expectations 
are not elicited in qualitative form (e.g., by 
asking individuals how likely to occur an 
event is, with options “very,” “fairly,” “not 
too,” or “not at all” likely), but in quantitative 
numerical form (e.g., on a scale out of 100).
An extensive literature demonstrates that 
respondents are willing and able to provide 
this information in probabilistic format. 
Manski (2004) and Hurd (2009) survey these 
findings in connection with data elicited 
in developed countries, while Delavande 
(2014) does the same in connection with data 
elicited in developing countries. The find-
ings include, inter alia, that there is substan-
tial heterogeneity in beliefs (at least in the 
contexts analyzed so far), and that elicited 
beliefs correlate with individuals’  observable 
characteristics similarly to how actual out-
comes do; see, e.g., Dominitz (1998) and 
Hurd and McGarry (2002). While it is not 
possible to evaluate directly whether the 
reported expectations are in fact those that 
respondents truly hold (because there can-
not be validation data for this information), 
numerous studies in different contexts have 
shown that, when asked about questions 
that are relevant to their lives, respondents 
give internally consistent answers. Examples 
include Dominitz and Manski (1997), who 
study individuals’ income expectations, and 
Manski and Straub (2000), who analyze indi-
viduals’ expectations of their job security, in 
both cases analyzing data from the Survey of 
Economic Expectations. Manski (2004, sec-
tions 5 and 6) summarizes their findings and 
the findings of many other studies.
For the literature on estimating risk pref-
erences in the field, using data on subjective 
expectations in place of objective probabili-
ties seems a promising approach for future 
work. Indeed, in other contexts, probabi-
listic expectations data have already been 
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used to enrich econometric analysis of field 
data, including retirement behavior (e.g., 
Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos 2004; van 
der Klaauw and Wolpin 2008), criminal 
behavior (e.g., Lochner 2007), contracep-
tive choices and updating of beliefs on con-
traceptive effectiveness (e.g., Delavande 
2008a, 2008b), and schooling choices (e.g., 
Giustinelli 2016 and Wiswall and Zafar 
2015).85
7.4 Assumptions about Mental Accounting
As we discuss in section 5.1.1, in order to 
estimate risk preferences in a field context, 
one must make assumptions about how the 
typically complex field context is translated 
into concrete choice data that can be used 
to estimate risk preferences. Such a step is, 
of course, part of most economic analyses—
economics is all about developing simplified 
models that capture the essence of a field 
context of interest. However, a second possi-
ble justification for such assumptions is that 
the agents themselves transform—and sim-
plify—a choice situation in their own minds 
before making a decision. This type of men-
tal operation on the part of agents is often 
labeled “mental accounting,” and thus we 
refer to these assumptions as mental account-
ing assumptions. An important agenda for 
future research is to pay more careful atten-
tion to these assumptions and investigate 
directly the impact of such assumptions on 
estimates of risk preferences.
An important dimension on which one 
must make a mental accounting assumption 
is how broadly versus narrowly households 
bracket their decisions. On one extreme, 
households could bracket all their deci-
sions together into one grand “life” deci-
sion—indeed, theoretical economic models 
are often written in this way. On the other 
85 Probabilistic expectations data have also been used to 
enrich experimental analyses, for example, by Nyarko and 
Schotter (2002) and Dominitz and Hung (2009). 
extreme, households could bracket very nar-
rowly and evaluate each decision in isolation 
from all others. There are also many possibil-
ities in between.
In fact, virtually all papers that estimate 
risk preferences implicitly—and occasionally 
explicitly—assume very narrow bracketing. 
They estimate risk preferences reflected in 
one particular choice in isolation from how 
that choice might interact with the many 
other choices that households make. In most 
cases, narrow bracketing is assumed merely 
to help the researcher. If one has data on 
only one decision per household, it is hard 
to assume anything other than narrow brack-
eting. Even when one has data on multiple 
decisions per household, it can be compu-
tationally burdensome to collect them all 
together into one grand decision.86 There 
may, however, be some psychological real-
ism to the assumption of narrow bracketing. 
Indeed, there is a literature that suggests that 
when people make multiple choices, they fre-
quently do not assess the consequences in an 
integrated way, but rather tend to make each 
choice in isolation (e.g., Read, Loewenstein, 
and Rabin 1999).
In future research, it is worth investigat-
ing more carefully how broadly households 
bracket their decisions. In simple terms, 
we need to understand whether estimates 
of risk preferences are biased by incorrect 
assumptions about bracketing. Even beyond 
this, if households do in fact bracket multi-
ple decisions together, then they are choos-
ing between more complex lotteries and, as 
highlighted in section 4, this might permit 
one to separately identify multiple sources 
of aversion to risk. Indeed, Barseghyan et al. 
(2013a) propose exactly this approach.
86 For instance, if one assumed daily bracketing at a 
horse track, and if on any day the track holds ten races with 
eight horses in each, then there are  8 10 possible lotteries 
that one could choose (and even this is restricting attention 
to win bets and ignoring any dynamics associated with bas-
ing later bets on earlier results). 
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Another aspect of bracketing is that, in 
many analyses, researchers treat what is 
really a dynamic choice as a static choice. 
Perhaps the best example is research on 
insurance choices. When people choose an 
insurance deductible, this is really part of a 
dynamic problem where they are choosing 
the budget constraints they’ll face in the 
future as a function of intervening events. 
Framed this way, it becomes clear that a 
major confound in insurance analyses is a 
fear of future liquidity constraints. If having 
to pay a $1,000 deductible will leave a house-
hold with little liquidity to spend on other 
needs, that household might choose a lower 
deductible not because of risk aversion with 
regard to lifetime wealth, but rather because 
of fear of short-term liquidity issues.87 The 
literature using macroeconomic data per-
forms better on this dimension, as it explicitly 
incorporates the dynamic life-cycle problems 
that households face. Nonetheless, even that 
literature tends to abstract away from house-
hold-specific details such as short-run liquid-
ity constraints.
A second dimension on which one must 
make a mental accounting assumption is 
what options enter a household’s consider-
ation set—that is, what options does a house-
hold take to be in its choice set. Because 
estimates of risk preferences can depend on 
what options are considered but not chosen, 
assumptions about the consideration set can 
alter estimates. To illustrate, consider a styl-
ized example: Suppose we observe an indi-
vidual in a casino who chooses to bet $10 on 
BLACK in roulette (on a typical roulette wheel 
that has both 0 and 00). This choice yields 
a risky lottery  (+$10, 18/38 ; −$10, 20/38) 
 that has an expected value of  − $0.526 . 
87 Even relatively wealthy households can face short-run 
liquidity concerns if they hold a large share of their wealth 
in illiquid assets. See Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014) 
for evidence on the prevalence of such “wealthy hand-to-
mouth” households. 
This person could have also bet $10 on #1, 
which instead would yield a riskier lottery 
 (+$360, 1/38 ; −$10, 37/38) that has a larger 
expected value of  − $0.263 . If we estimated, 
for example, an EU model focusing on the 
fact that the person chose to bet on BLACK 
rather than bet on #1, we would conclude 
that the person is risk averse, and we could 
infer a lower bound on the magnitude of this 
risk aversion. However, if instead we esti-
mated an EU model focusing on the fact that 
the person chose to bet on BLACK rather 
than to not bet at all, we would instead con-
clude that the person is risk loving, and we 
could infer a lower bound on the magnitude 
of this risk lovingness.
The intuition of this example extends 
almost immediately to research that esti-
mates risk preferences using data from horse 
races. In such analyses, one must make an 
assumption about whether the option not 
to bet is included in the consideration set. 
Because the expected return on most horses 
is negative, including the option not to bet 
in the consideration set will yield estimates 
of risk preferences that are more risk lov-
ing.88 But this issue also applies to property 
insurance. When estimating preferences 
from deductible choices, one might wonder 
whether households consider the possibility 
of not insuring at all, and also whether they 
turn down any insurance options from other 
firms that are not in the data set. In future 
research, it is worth investigating more care-
fully the determinants and importance of 
consideration sets.
A third dimension on which one must 
make a mental accounting assumption is what 
are the possible outcomes that  households 
consider. To illustrate, consider property 
insurance. When  researchers  estimate risk 
88 This issue is mostly solved if one estimates utility 
 nonparametrically, as in Snowberg and Wolfers (2010), 
where the estimated utility for not betting has no impact 
on the estimated utility for winning or losing money. 
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preferences using data on property insur-
ance, they typically assume that households 
only consider the possibility of incurring no 
loss or a single loss during the policy period. 
However, in principle, one might incur two, 
three, or even more losses during a policy 
period. If so, then the set of lotteries from 
which households are choosing are differ-
ent. The assumption of zero or one loss is 
often made for simplicity, but again it could 
reflect a psychological realism, as people 
seem to have a hard time imagining and 
accounting for all the possibilities that could 
occur in life. This is especially true in more 
complex domains, such as health insurance, 
where it seems quite likely that households 
approach decisions with a simplified con-
ceptualization of all the possible outcomes 
that might occur.
Moving forward, we think it important 
that the literature considers more carefully 
and more directly these and other mental 
accounting assumptions when estimating 
risk preferences. Such assumptions can mat-
ter under EU, and they become even more 
important under RDEU and other more 
complex models of risk preferences.
7.5 Concluding Thoughts
The literature on identification and esti-
mation of risk preferences using field data 
has improved a lot over the years, especially 
in the past decade. As more and more forms 
of field data become available, we expect 
the literature will continue to blossom, and 
we hope our analysis in this review will help 
frame the development of the literature.
In particular, we have highlighted a 
number of important dimensions on which 
researchers must make some key choices. 
In looking for field contexts, one must 
think through the trade-offs associated with 
individual versus aggregate data, as well 
as those associated with studying  simple 
versus complex choices. In developing a 
model of how individuals make choices, 
researchers must make three broad catego-
ries of assumptions: (i) assumptions about 
how the modeler—and perhaps the agents 
themselves—transform and simplify the 
real-world choice situation into a well-de-
fined choice; (ii) assumptions about agents’ 
subjective beliefs, the extent to which they 
correspond to objective beliefs, and the 
extent of heterogeneity; and (iii) assump-
tions about the possible sources of aversion 
to risk. Moreover, when one uses aggregate 
data, there is a fourth category of assump-
tions: (iv) assumptions about the nature of 
market forces. Our analysis has highlighted 
the importance of all of these dimensions, 
and indeed, our discussion of directions for 
future research in this section suggests yet 
new ways to approach many of these dimen-
sions. There clearly is much to be done, and 
we look forward to watching it all evolve.
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